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Introduction
One of the last frontiers in American civil rights protection concerns
the extent to which lawmakers-both legislative and judicial-show a will-
ingness to prohibit workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Regrettably, the record of the United States has been less than exemplary.
Human rights legislation covering sexual orientation is limited to a few
states and localities, gay and lesbian employees enjoy no federal protection
from employment discrimination and, generally speaking, the judiciary has
displayed a reluctance to defend expansively the rights of the nation's
"homosexual"' minority. The failure to address discrimination based on
sexual orientation not only sanctions unjust treatment of gay and lesbian em-
ployees, but also perpetuates societal prejudice.
The objective of this Article is to compare America's responses to em-
ployment discrimination based on sexual orientation with the Canadian and
United Kingdom (U.K.) responses. It will become clear that Canada leads in
the judicial and legislative defense of sexual orientation rights while the
U.K., though potentially at the cross-roads between protecting and disre-
garding the human rights of homosexuals, is more closely aligned with the
American approach of non-protection, if recent developments in the case law
of the European Court of Justice are any indication.
The Article is divided into several parts. Each part compares the U.S.,
Canadian and U.K. responses to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Part I references studies and commentary from elected officials to reveal
anti-homosexual attitudes and the problems those attitudes present for pro-
tecting gay and lesbian employees. Part II explores constitutional protec-
tions against sexual orientation discrimination. Part III highlights the extent
to which the gay or lesbian employee can find protection through human
rights legislation. Part IV turns to the common law and considers its com-
petence to protect gay and lesbian employees from discrimination. The Ar-
ticle concludes by emphasizing the importance of legislative intervention to
protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.
Such legislative action would provide an alternative to inadequate common
Parlee McLaws for their assistance and encouragement. The authors are also
grateful to Sandra Wilkins, Research Librarian at the Faculty of Law, University
of Alberta, for her research assistance and to Kim Cordeiro for her assistance in
the preparation of this manuscript.
1. As Professor Bruce MacDougall has observed, terminology in this area is a
"loaded subject." Bruce MacDougall, Silence on the Classroom: Limits on Homo-
sexual Expressions and Visibility in Education and the Privileging of Homophobic
Religious Theology, 61 SASK. L. REV. 41, 41 n.1 (1998). Like MacDougall, we use
the term "homosexual" in this Article because it is commonly used in the case law.
Also like MacDougall, we will sidestep the issue of the social construction of homo-
sexuality. Additionally, we have not addressed the specific civil rights issues re-
garding bisexuals, although to a great extent they are closely allied with the rights
of gays and lesbians.
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law protections and also serve as a symbol of solidarity between the state
and homosexuals.
I. Anti-Homosexual Sentiment and Public Policy
A. The United States
In September 1996, the United States Senate acted on two important
pieces of legislation affecting the treatment of lesbians and gay men.2 An
overwhelming majority of senators and representatives voted in favor of a
law that prohibits agencies of the federal government from recognizing
same-sex marriages.' Another bill, which sought to protect lesbians and gay
men from employment discrimination, lost by a single vote in the Senate4
and was not introduced in the House. In June 1997, the bill was again intro-
duced and referred to committees in both houses of Congress.' The debate
over these measures included a substantial amount of distressing and deplor-
able rhetoric, including this statement by Senator Nickles (R-Okla.), a leader
of the opposition to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and a leading
proponent of the Defense of Marriage Act: "The very definition of bisexual
means you are promiscuous. You are having sex with males and females."6
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) raised the specter of child molestation when he re-
counted the comments of a local school board member who stated:
[In Loudoun County, Virginia,] we have a [homosexual] teacher in a
middle school working with children who are at that age where they are
struggling with their identity. This is obviously a person who has made
bad choices. To give someone like this access to children at that stage of
development would be irresponsible of us.
7
The rhetoric of both senators illustrates the prejudice and ignorance
surrounding gay and lesbian civil rights at the highest levels of government.
Similar negative stereotyping has led to harassment, discrimination and even
2. See 75 CONG. INDEX (CCH), at 1 (Sept. 13, 1996) (discussing Senate votes
on the Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 105th Cong. (1996) (enacted), and the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2056, 105th Cong. (1996)).
3. This bill passed the House of Representatives on a vote of 342 in favor, 67
opposed; and in the Senate, 85 in favor, 14 opposed. See 142 CONG. REC. H7505-06
(daily ed. July 12, 1996) (House vote); 142 CONG. REC. S10, 129 (daily ed. Sept. 10,
1996) (Senate vote). It was signed by President Clinton on Sept. 21, 1996. See
Statement on Same Gender Marriage, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1635 (Sept. 20, 1996).
4. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,139 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
5. H.R. 1858 and S. 869 were introduced on June 10, 1997. See 143 CONG.
REC. H3659 (daily ed. June 10, 1997); 143 CONG. REC. S444 (daily ed. June 10,
1997).
6. Deb Price, Anti-Discrimination Vote Shows Senate May Not Be So Chilly
Toward Gay Rights, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 13, 1996, at El.




violence in the workplace.8 A review of twenty-one surveys of lesbian, gay
and bisexual people found that between 16% and 46% of survey respondents
reported having experienced employment discrimination in some form re-
lated to hiring, promotion, firing or harassment.9 Moreover, there is evi-
dence that gay men, identified in the workplace as being gay, suffer eco-
nomic disadvantage of between 11% and 27% reduction in earnings.'"
Fortunately, not all responses to the equal treatment of homosexual in-
dividuals have been negative. Senator Robb (D-Va.), who was the only
Southern senator to vote against the Defense of Marriage Act and for the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act," warned: :[I]f we don't stand here
against this [Defense of Marriage] bill, we will stand on the wrong side of
history." 2 Senator Robb also stated:
I suspect that for older generations fear has often kept this issue from
being discussed openly before now-fear that anyone who expressed an
understanding view of the plight of homosexuals was likely to be la-
beled one. Because of this fear, the battle against discrimination has
largely been left to those who were directly affected by it. I believe it is
time for those of us who are not homosexual to join the fight.13
B. Canada
The American senators noted above have their Canadian counterparts.
Mr. Bob Ringma, a Reform Member of Parliament (MP), stated to a news-
paper on April 29, 1996, that he would dismiss "or move to the back of the
8. Recent events demonstrate the violence and the lack of remedy:
Take the case of Ernest Dillon, a gay postal worker in Michigan who was
taunted, ostracized and beaten unconscious by co-workers. When Dillon
brought the matter up to his supervisors, they told him not to waste their
time. In a subsequent lawsuit, a federal court rejected his complaint be-
cause discrimination based on sexual orientation is not covered under fed-
eral law.
Gay Rights Issue Won't Go Away: Senate Fluke Isn't Enough to End the Quest for
Employment Equality, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1996, at B8.
9. See M. V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimina-
tion, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 726, 728 (1995).
10. See id. at 737. According to Badgett, the evidence of economic disadvan-
tage for lesbians was less significant. See id. The author of the study suggests
that the lack of statistical significance, after correcting for occupation and selection
bias, is attributed to the small sample size or the survey model's failure to account
for unobservable differences between lesbian and heterosexual women in the work
force. See id. The fact that economic disadvantage is not readily recognized may
account for the attitude that gays and lesbians do not need civil rights protection
as a group. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (explaining the U.S. Su-
preme Court's view that homosexuals are not economically disadvantaged).
11. See 142 CONG. REC. S10, 129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (voting record show-
ing that Sen. Robb voted against the Defense of Marriage Act); 142 CONG. REC.
S10,132 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (voting record showing that Sen. Robb voted for
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act).
12. 142 CONG. REC. S10, 123 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robb).
13. Id. at S10,122.
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shop" any gay employees whose presence offended customers.'4 Mr.
Ringma continued: "If I had a business and a homosexual was there work-
ing for me and he was responsible for my losing business, then indeed I
would think of letting him go, just as I would think of letting go anyone else
who was losing business for me."' 5 Another MP, Dr. Grant Hill, stated dur-
ing debate on bill C-33 (a bill to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act16 to
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation) that if homo-
sexuals were protected from discrimination, it would encourage the spread of
disease and promote an unhealthy lifestyle.'7 "My specific problem with this
bill is that it will produce and allow a promotion of an unhealthy lifestyle,
[because homosexuals suffer from] HIV, gay bowel syndrome, increasing
parasitic infections, lowered life expectancy and... hepatitis.""
Perhaps not to be outdone, MP Jake Hoeppner suggested that civil un-
rest might be the result of bill C-33:
If we want to look at what homosexuality and permissiveness have done
to some countries let us look at Africa and the problems it has run into.
Are we to destroy the family and destroy the government? Let us look
at Liberia right now. Do we want that type of system. [sic] I do not.' 9
The homophobic attitudes of politicians like Hill and Hoeppner are
also reflected in sexual orientation discrimination in the Canadian work-
place." Stephen Samis's conclusions in his study of homophobia are sum-
marized in the following terms:
The most comprehensive Canadian survey to date concerning harass-
ment of and discrimination against lesbians and gay men in the work-
place determined that because of their sexual orientation, 21.4 percent
of the survey's respondents believed that they had not been hired, 20.1
believed that they had not been promoted, and 20.5 percent believed
that they had been fired .... [I]n addition to actual harassment and dis-
crimination in the workplace, the survey determined that there was
overwhelming concern among lesbians and gay men that they would in
the future face sexual orientation discrimination. For example, when
14. Jim Morris, Party Backs Reform MP Who Would Fire Blacks, Gays, NAT'L
GEN. NEWS (Ottawa), Apr. 30, 1996, available in QL System, CP96. For good
measure, Ringma indicated that he would fire a black employee for the same rea-
son. See id.
15. Id.
16. R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.).
17. See Linda Drouin, Reform MP Says Equality for Gays Would Promote Un-
healthy Lifestyle, NAT'L GEN. NEWS (Ottawa), May 7, 1996, available in QL Sys-
tem, CP96.
18. Id.
19. Reform MP Sees Civil War the Result of Homosexuality NAT'L GEN. NEWS,
May 9, 1996, available in QL System, CP96.
20. See DONALD CASSWELL, LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND CANADIAN LAW 171 (1996)
(summarizing Stephen Samis, An Injury to One Is an Injury to All: Heterosexism,
Homophobia, and Anti-Gay/Lesbian Violence in Greater Vancouver (1994)




asked "Are you afraid you could experience employment discrimination
because you are lesbian, gay or bisexual?" 62.6 percent of males and
79.8 percent of females answered "Yes," and 75.3 percent of male and
73.4 percent of female respondents who answered "Yes" to the question
conceal their orientation in employment situations "Sometimes" or
"Always."
21
In spite of anti-homosexual attitudes and rhetoric, however, the Cana-
dian Parliament passed bill C-33 in a free vote and by a large majority. 2
Section 2 of the Canadian Human Rights Act now reads as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect,
within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of
Parliament, to the principle that all individuals should have an equal
opportunity to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish
to have, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of soci-
ety, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discrimi-
natory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, relig-
ion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability
or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.23
The Senate also passed the bill by an overwhelming majority,24 and it
came into force on June 20, 1996.25
This amendment to Canada's human rights legislation, representing
governmental resolve to protect the human rights of homosexual individu-
als, is a logical outgrowth of the Canadian Supreme Court's ruling in Egan
v. Canada.26 Justice Cory, dissenting in part, stated that those of a same-sex
orientation have suffered an "historic disadvantage" which has been "widely
recognized. '27 As Justice Cory summarizes the matter:
Public harassment and verbal abuse of homosexual persons is not un-
common. Homosexual women and men have been the victims of
crimes of violence directed at them specifically because of their sexual
orientation .... They have been discriminated against in their em-
ployment and their access to services. They have been excluded from
some aspects of public life solely because of their sexual orientation...
21. Id.
22. See COMMONS DEBATES 2587 (1996). The vote was 153 in favor; 76 op-
posed. See id.
23. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 2 (1985) (Can.) (emphasis
added). The amendment goes on, in section three, to identify sexual orientation as
a prohibited ground of discrimination. See id. § 3.
24. See SENATE DEBATES 552 (1996). The vote was 54 in favor; six opposed.
See id.
25. See Canada Statute Citator c19-1 (Can. Law Book Inc. Mar. 1998).
26. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. It should also be observed that, previous to this
amendment, the Ontario Court of Appeals in Haig v. Canada (1992), 94 D.L.R.
(4th) 1, had ordered that the Canadian Human Rights Act be read as if it did pro-
hibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id. at 14. The Haig court
ruled that such a reading was required by the equality provision of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See id. at 6 (quoting CAN. CONST. (Constitution
Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 15(1)).
27. Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R at 518 (Cory, J. dissenting in part).
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The stigmatization of homosexual persons and the hatred which some
members of the public have expressed towards them has forced many
homosexuals to conceal their orientation. This imposes its own associ-
ated costs in the work place, the community and in private life.
2
C. The United Kingdom
While there is evidence that public opinion may be slowly turning to-
wards a greater tolerance and acceptance of homosexuality,29 it is still easy
to find examples of homophobic attitudes in government.30 In a speech wel-
coming legislation preventing the "positive promotion" of homosexuality by
local authorities, one politician noted:
Those bunch of queers that legalise filth in homosexuality have a lot to
answer for and I hope they are proud of what they have done .... It is
disgusting and diabolical. As a cure I would put 90 per cent of queers
in the ruddy gas chamber. I would shoot them all. Are we going to
keep letting these queers trade their filth up and down the country? We
must find a way of stopping these gays going around.
31
Like the other jurisdictions under consideration in this Article, there is
clear evidence in the U.K. of discrimination against gay people in housing,
employment, education and other public services as a direct result of their
sexual orientation. 32 In the employment field, gay men and lesbians are sin-
gled out for security vetting procedures for all posts in the diplomatic serv-
ice, the police special branch, the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority and for
posts with any firm which has a government contract involving classified
material. 33 Gay men and lesbians are also treated differentially in the armed
forces: there is an absolute bar on their employment. 34 This government
28. Id. at 600-01(citations omitted) (Cory, J. dissenting in part). Note that all
the Supreme Court justices agreed that homosexuals were entitled to section 15
protection, but differed on whether the legislation in question was unconstitutional
or not. See id. at 514-22.
29. In the "gays in the military" case, Regina v. Ministry of Defence, [1996]
Q.B. 517 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.), affd, [1996] Q.B. 551 (Eng. C.A.), Simon Brown, L.J., of
the Court of Queen's Bench stated that he personally disagreed with the Ministry
of Defence's policy that homosexuality was incompatible with service in the armed
forces. See Regina, [1996] Q.B. at 540.
30. See SUSAN S. M. EDWARDS, SEX AND GENDER IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 73-76
(1996) (listing examples of homophobic attitudes in government in the U.K.).
31. Id. at 74 (citing HIGH RISK LIVES: LESBIAN AND GAY POLITICS AFrER THE
CLAUSE 4 (T. Kaufman et al. eds., 1991)).
32. See id. at 53-58.
33. See id. The Security Commission recommended that homosexuality should
not be treated as an absolute bar to the positive vetting clearance for these posts.
See id. The procedures were introduced in 1952 and the most recent revision was
in 1990. See id. The aim is to safeguard national security and counter terrorism.
See id.
34. See Regina, [1996] Q.B. at 524. The prohibitions derive from sections 66
and 69 of the Army Act 1955; sections 66 and 69 of the Air Force Act 1955 and sec-
tions 37 and 39 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957. See id.; Air Force Act, 1955, ch.
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policy was criticized in Regina v. Ministry of Defence.35 The court criticized
the armed force's anti-homosexual policy in the following words:
The tide of history is against the ministry. Prejudices are breaking
down; old barriers are being removed. It seems to me improbable,
whatever this court may say, that the existing policy can survive for
much longer. I doubt whether most of those present in court throughout
the proceedings now believe otherwise.
36
Despite the judicial optimism expressed above, an independent study
by the Social and Community Planning and Research Group has confirmed
the serious nature and extent of discrimination against gay men and women
in the U.K. 37 Based on questionnaires and interviews with a random sample
of homosexual, bisexual and heterosexual employees, the study concluded
that the problem was widespread. 38 The study found that 4% of gay employ-
ees have lost their jobs because of their sexuality; 8% have been refused
promotion; 21% have been harassed at work; and 64% have concealed their
sexuality from colleagues at work.3 9 The study confirms that homophobic
attitudes are endemic in British society.
D. Conclusion
While homophobic attitudes cross national boundaries, legal responses
to discrimination based on sexual orientation are varied. Societal prejudice
influences the legal protections available to gay and lesbian employees, but
this Article will show that Canada, and to a lesser extent the U.K., have
taken stronger steps to address sexual orientation discrimination. The next
sections will compare constitutional, statutory and common law protections
in these three jurisdictions.
II. The Constitutional Status of Gay Men and Lesbians
A. Introduction
Constitutional law is a conspicuous place to inquire after protection
against sexual orientation discrimination. A national constitution, whether
contained in a single document as in the United States, or in a variety of
sources as is the case for Canada and the U.K., is "an agreement among the
19, §§ 66, 69 (Eng.); Army Act, 1955, ch. 18, §§ 66, 69 (Eng.). The position was ex-
pressly maintained by section 1(5) and section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967.
See Regina, [1996] Q.B. at 524.
35. See Regina, [1996] Q.B. at 533.
36. Id.
37. See Jilly Welch, The Invisible Minority, PEOPLE MGMT., Sept. 26, 1996, at
31.
38. See id. at 24.
39. See id. at 31.
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people to determine the nature of their community ' as well as an instru-
ment defining the nature of the individual-state relationship. Therefore, the
extent to which constitutions protect against sexual orientation discrimina-
tion provides important evidence regarding state and societal attitudes to-
ward gay men and lesbians."
A starting point for a constitutional comparison of the jurisdictions un-
der analysis is first, whether consensual homosexual sex has been criminal-
ized and second, the judicial response to such criminalization. Consensual
gay and lesbian sex was decriminalized in Canada in 1969.42 As then-Justice
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau observed at the time: "The state has no place
in the nation's bedroom. 43 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, male homo-
sexual sex was decriminalized in Great Britain in 1967" and in Northern
Ireland in 1982." 5 These changes in the criminal law followed the Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom' decision by the European Court of Human Rights in
1982, holding that the prohibitions against homosexual conduct in the crimi-
nal law were in breach of the right to privacy and in contravention of Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as applied to men over the
age of twenty-one. 7 This case, which was the first to raise the issue of gay
rights in international human rights law, holds an important place in the his-
40. Jules Lobel, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign
Affairs: Rights-Here and There: The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 871,
875 (1989).
41. For a scholarly review of constitutional protections for gay men and lesbi-
ans, see ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, AND THE CANADIAN
CHARTER (1995); CASSWELL, supra note 20.
42. See Criminal Law Amendment Act, ch. 38, 1968-1969 S.C. 869 (Can.). On a
related front, the Immigration Act of 1952 was amended in 1976 to remove homo-
sexuality as a ground of prohibition of entry to or deportation from Canada. See
CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 566.
43. COLOMBO'S CANADIAN QUOTATIONS 595 (John Robert Columbo ed., 1974)
(Dec. 22, 1967 Ottawa interview). The authors extend their appreciation to Wanda
Quoika-Stanks, Research Librarian, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, for her
assistance in finding the source of this quotation.
44. See Sexual Offences Act, 1967, ch. 60 (Eng.).
45. See Homosexual Offense (Northern Ireland) Order, 1982 N. Ir. Stat. No.
1536 (1982).
46. App. No. 7525/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40 (1982) (Commission report). This
case is discussed in SUE FARRAN, THE UK BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 202-08 (1996).
47. See Dudgeon, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40. For a similar development in Aus-
tralia, see Communication No. 488/1992, Toonen V. Australia, U.N. GAOR Hum.
Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II at 226, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), in
which the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled that statutes criminal-
izing homosexual sodomy in Tasmania violated the rights of privacy and nondis-
crimination protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The case is discussed in Lawrence Hefler & Alice Miller, Sexual Orientation and
Human Rights, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61 (1996).
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tory of the equality struggle for gay men and lesbians.48 The decision forced
the British Government to revise the Northern Ireland legislation to bring it
into line with the rest of the U.K.4 9 While the age of consent for private ho-
mosexual acts has been lowered to eighteen years," it is still higher than the
age of consent for heterosexual acts, which is sixteen.5
By contrast, in the United States, the constitutionality of the criminal
sodomy statute from the state of Georgia was upheld in the 1986 case of
Bowers v. Hardwick.52 The United States Supreme Court held, in a five to
four decision, that the sodomy laws of Georgia (and, by analogy, those of
twenty-four other states) did not violate the constitutional right to privacy,
given the historical roots of anti-sodomy legislation. 3 The Court went on to
distinguish the right asserted in Bowers from other recent privacy cases be-
cause no connection was established between family, marriage or procrea-
tion on the one hand, and homosexual activity, on the other. 4 In a well-
reasoned and vehement dissent, however, Justice Blackmun rejected the
majority's analysis of the case:
I believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's claim in the light of
the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that right
means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens
for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it
must do more than assert that the choice they have made is an
'abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians.'
55
Fortified by the majority reasoning in Bowers, nineteen states56 continue to
48. See James Kingston, Sex and Sexuality under the European Convention on
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 179-95 (L. Heffron
ed. 1994). Sanders has described the case as "the watershed event in international
human rights law for lesbian women and gay men" in Douglas Sanders, Getting
Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights Agenda, 18 HuM. RTS.
Q. 67, 78 (1996).
49. See Sanders, supra note 48, at 79.
50. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, ch. 33, § 145(1) (Eng.).
The unequal age of consent laws are currently being challenged before the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights. See Sanders, supra note 48, at 80.
51. See Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 6 (Eng.).
52. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. See id. at 192.
54. Id. at 191.
55. See id. at 199 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (citing Herring v. State, 119 Ga.
709, 721 (1904)).
56. See Sabine Koji, Constitutional Law---Campbell v. Sundquist: Tennessee's
Homosexual Practices Act Violates the Right to Privacy, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 311,
n.122 (1997). Of the 19 states, 13 criminalize same and opposite sex sodomy, and
six criminalize only same sex sodomy. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
The Right to Privacy (last modified Dec. 1998)
<http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/sodomy1298.pdf>. The Georgia Supreme Court
recently struck down the Georgia statute, holding that it violated the right to pri-
vacy guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution. See Powell v. State, No. $98A0755,
1998 Ga. LEXIS 1148, at *10-14 (Ga. Nov. 23, 1998) (decision not final until expi-




As will be seen in the next section, constitutional protections for ho-
mosexuals in the United States remain weak, especially when compared to
those in Canada.58 While there can be no single account for this difference,
the continued constitutionality of criminal sodomy statutes in America is
rooted in homophobic attitudes that are an important part of the explana-
tion.59 In fact, the legal status of homosexual relations in the criminal law
context appears to be a harbinger in the development of civil law protections
based on sexual orientation.60
B. The Constitutional Status of Homosexual Persons in the United
States
It is well known that the United States Constitution protects funda-
57. A different constitutional tack was taken in another case involving Michael
Bowers, the attorney general of Georgia who defended the state sodomy law in
Bowers v. Hardwick. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998). This case involved Robin Shahar, a law student who
was offered a job in the Georgia State Legal Department headed by Bowers. See
id. at 1100. Upon learning that Shahar had entered into a marriage ceremony
with her lesbian partner, Bowers withdrew the offer of employment, and Shahar
sued him. See id. at 1101. The court of appeals assumed arguendo that the dis-
trict court correctly characterized the issue in the case as involving plaintiffs right
to freely associate under the First Amendment, rather than a denial of equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1097. First Amendment
rights, however, are not absolute and must be balanced against the government
interest at stake. See id. at 1102-03 (citing balancing test from Pickering v. Board
of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 566-68 (1968)). Thus, the court of appeals in Shahar weighed
the plaintiffs right to associate with whomever she chose against the defendant's
responsibility to defend Georgia laws and prosecute those who break them, in-
cluding those who break sodomy laws. See id. at 1105. The court concluded that
even if Shahar had a right of association that included the right to associate with a
same-sex partner, the defendant reasonably believed that Shahar's sexual orienta-
tion and public marriage ceremony would seriously undermine public confidence in
the office of the Attorney General. See id. at 1106-10. Moreover, the court held
that the Attorney General was to be afforded greater deference than other employ-
ers because of the trust required in his relationship with staff. See id. at 1103-04.
The court held that the balance of interests weighed in favor of the defendant's
withdrawal of the offer of employment. See id. at 1110. Under a different set of
facts, however, a gay or lesbian plaintiffs right to freely associate might well out-
weigh any interest the government could assert to justify discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.
58. See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text (exploring the constitutional
status of homosexuals in the United States). See generally, Bobbie Bernstein,
Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak. Litigating "Outness" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REv. 269 (1995) (exploring the backdrop and rea-
sons behind failures in constitutional challenges to homosexual discrimination in
the United States).
59. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text (discussing homophobic atti-
tudes in the U.S.).




mental rights-including privacy, intimate association, due process and
equal protection of the law-and that constitutional protection is particularly
important when discrimination is visited upon a class of persons who are al-
ready stigmatized in society. As Justice Stone noted in his famous footnote
in United States v. Carolene Products Co.: "[P]rejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial scrutiny."'" Thus, the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause has been the basis of a heightened degree of scru-
tiny by the courts of government actions that negatively affect certain dis-
crete and insular groups, such as women and African-Americans.62
Despite the significance of equal protection under the Constitution, its
reach is admittedly limited because a constitution protects people only from
government or state action, not from the actions of private individuals.
63
Furthermore, since most civil rights plaintiffs who allege discrimination in
the public sector rely on the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion,' such plaintiffs must also establish themselves as members of a par-
ticular group recognized as deserving a high level of judicial scrutiny based
on the group classification.' Laws that classify based on race receive the
strictest scrutiny, and have consistently been struck down by the courts, be-
cause that classification is found not to be necessary to achieve any legiti-
mate government objective.66 Classifications based on gender are given an
intermediate level of scrutiny, and the proponent of such a classification
61. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
62. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho law
giving males a preference over females as estate administrators); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia's law prohibiting interracial marriages
unconstitutional).
63. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). The Thirteenth, Four-
teenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution were passed shortly after
the Civil War. See POCKET GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 28-
30 (1996). But it was almost 100 years later before the Congress of the United
States passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act that would finally make discrimination
based on race unlawful in the private sector. See Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000 (1994).
64. "nor [shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
65. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1436-54 (1988).
Thus, a law which classifies people based on race is subject to the strictest scrutiny
and is likely to be struck down as unconstitutional, whereas a classification based
on being a smoker, for example, would be subject only to limited scrutiny and
would probably be upheld. See Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that smoking is not a fundamental right and thus deserves only rational
basis review); Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1988) (stating
that classification on the basis of race deserves strict scrutiny).
66. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down laws that
had disparate effects on Chinese launderers).
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would have to make a compelling justification for a law which classifies
people based on their gender in order to successfully withstand this interme-
diate scrutiny.67 Classifications based upon sexual orientation have not been
categorized as suspect, 68 perhaps because, as a group, lesbians and gay men
are not perceived as having suffered the economic deprivation and political
powerlessness associated with other protected groups. In fact, Justice Scalia
took the position in his dissent in Romer v. Evans69 that the majority of citi-
zens in Colorado needed a constitutional amendment forbidding protection
of lesbians and gay men because "those who engage in homosexual conduct
tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, . . . have
high disposable income, . . . and of course care about homosexual rights is-
sues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess political
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide."70
Lesbians and gay men have recently received a measure of constitu-
tional recognition in the United States through the Romer decision, but this
recognition has exceptionally limited precedential value for discrimination
issues in the public workplace. In Romer, the Supreme Court was asked to
rule on the constitutionality of a referendum-approved amendment to Colo-
rado's state constitution which sought to prohibit localities from passing or-
dinances which ban discrimination based on sexual orientation.7 The ma-
jority of the Court held that the amendment violated the Constitution of the
United States by singling out a group (homosexuals) and prohibiting its
members from influencing the political process with regard to a particular
issue, while all other groups would be free to do so."
Significantly, the Romer court merely held that the amendment vio-
lated the fundamental right of all persons to participate in the political proc-
ess. 73 It did not find that sexual orientation could be the basis for recogniz-
67. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma
law prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and females un-
der the age of 18).
68. See generally Bernstein, supra note 58, at 269. Bernstein concludes that
the classification of homosexuality under the Equal Protection Clause has not been
a successful approach for gay victims of discrimination, and proposes instead that
the expression of one's sexual identity (coming out), should be subject to strict
scrutiny as a fundamental right of free expression under the First Amendment.
Id.
69. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1995).
70. Id. at 1634 (Scalia J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 1620. The amendment passed with a 53% majority, but was
never enforced, as litigation commenced immediately. See Evans v. Romer, 854
P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993). The Supreme Court of Colorado enjoined the en-
forcement of the amendment until final disposition by the United States Supreme
Court. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
72. See Roiner, 116 S. Ct. at 1621.
73. See id. at 1628-29.
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ing a specially protected class.74 Notwithstanding the court's decision, some
scholars believe that the Romer decision means that Bowers v. Hardwick75
would be overruled if another litigant were to bring "such sex crime laws
before the Court."76 Others, such as Professor Robert Wintemute, persua-
sively contend that the reasoning of the court in Romer was so circumscribed
that the judges in the majority "left themselves plenty of room to limit
Romer" and follow Bowers in future cases.77 According to Wintemute, "a
future majority of the court might point to the difference between 'status'
and 'conduct' as explaining the difference between invalid 'animosity' [as
determined by the court in Romer] and valid 'sentiments about morality' [the
rationale of Bowers]. "78 So far at least, Romer is not thought of as a strong
victory for the equal rights of homosexuals. Discourse surrounding civil
rights for gay men and lesbians in the U.S. is still strongly influenced by
"traditional" notions of morality and family.
C. The Constitutional Status of Homosexual Persons in Canada
The lack of constitutional protection in the U.S. is in marked contrast
to such protection in Canada.79 In Egan v. Canada,"0 Justice Cory deter-
mined that those of a same-sex orientation have suffered an "historic disad-
vantage"'" as a result of having been the chronic targets of crimes of vio-
lence, public harassment, verbal abuse and employment discrimination. 2
All members of the Court ruled that homosexuals are a constitutionally pro-
tected class under the section 15 equality provision contained in the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.83 Section 15 of the charter states that
"every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in par-
ticular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, col-
our, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." 4
74. See id. at 1629. According to Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in
Romer, the purpose of Amendment 2 was to "both counter the geographic concen-
tration and the disproportionate political power of homosexuals" in certain areas of
Colorado. Id. at 1634. Such a rationale suggests that the intent of the proponents
of the amendment was indeed to limit the exercise of political power by a group
deemed "undesirable" by a state-wide majority. See id. at 1634-35.
75. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
76. Ian Loveland, Gay Rights in the USA?, 146 NEW L.J. 1847, 1847 (1996).
77. Robert Wintemute, A 'T undamental Right to be Gay" in the USA? Not Yet,
PUB. L., Autumn 1997, at 420, 420.
78. Id. at 421.
79. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing Constitutional
protection in Canada).
80. [19951 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.).
81. Id. at 600.
82. See id. at 600-01.
83. See id. at 514.
84. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
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Even though section 15 does not expressly protect gay men and lesbi-
ans, it is to be read as if it did because sexual orientation is analogous to spe-
cifically enumerated grounds such as race and sex.85 The decision in Egan
very clearly means that governmental persons are prohibited from discrimi-
nating against gay men and lesbians.86 If such discrimination occurs which
cannot be "demonstrably justified, 87 the plaintiff is entitled under section 24
to "such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circum-
stances. 88
Freedoms), § 15.
85. See Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 514.
86. Though providing homosexuals the status of an analogous group under sec-
tion 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Egan went on to hold
that the definition of spouse in the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C., ch. 0-9 (1985)
(Can.), which was restricted to a person of the opposite sex, was not impeachable.
Id. at 515-16.
The reasoning of Egan was recently applied by the Ontario Court of Appeals in
Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 577. The court ruled
unconstitutional the restriction in the Canadian Income Tax Act that registration
of a private pension plan with Revenue Canada is only permissible if the plan re-
stricts survivorship benefits to spouses of the opposite sex. See id. at 577. Ac-
cording to Justice Abella: "The government's objective in favoring heterosexual
partnership choices permits intolerance of the constitutionally protected rights of
gays and lesbians. As such it is discriminatory and cannot be viewed as justifica-
tion for a constitutional violation." Id. at 586. She further observed: "Differences
in cohabitation and gender preferences are a reality to be equitably acknowledged,
not an indulgence to be economically penalized. There is less to fear from ac-
knowledging conjugal diversity than from tolerating exclusionary prejudice." Id.
at 589.
Egan has also recently been relied on by the Ontario Court of Appeal in M. v.
H. (1996), 31 O.R. (3d) 417, 419 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. granted, No.
25838, [1997] S.C.C.A. QL 101, at 3 (Apr. 24, 1997). The court ruled unconstitu-
tional the exclusion of same sex couples from the definition of spouse in section 29
of the Ontario Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F-3 (1990). See id. at 418. In Kane v.
A.G. Ontario (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 738, 739 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.), the Ontario
Court held that the definition of spouse in the Ontario Insurance Act is unconsti-
tutional because it restricted death benefits to opposite sex couples. The court dis-
tinguished Egan on the basis that the additional premium costs would be minimal
to the insured. See id. at 745-46.
In McAleer v. Canada the court relied on Egan to uphold the constitutionality
of a law making it a discriminatory practice to communicate hate messages
against an identifiable group by telephone. (1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 672, 677
(F.C.T.D.). In this case, the applicants had disseminated a recorded message by
telephone advocating the trampling of'queers' into the peat bog. See id. at 675.
87. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms). Section 1 provides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reason-
able limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society." Id. § 1.
88. Id. § 24.
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D. Constitutional Status of Homosexual Persons in the United
Kingdom
The United Kingdom has no formal written constitution, and discus-
sion of the constitutional protection of gays and lesbians is not useful, at
least within the context of domestic law. In addition, the distinction between
public and private employment is not one that is commonly made. 9 As a
general rule, legislation in the area applies equally to public and private em-
ployers, 9° with only the most limited exceptions in the case of employment
in the armed forces, if national security grounds apply.9 However, the
United Kingdom is a member of both the Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Union, and the instruments of both organizations have a status which is
in some senses akin to constitutional protection, as a form of "higher law."92
With regard to the Council of Europe, Article 8 of its (European) Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others. 93
89. See generally Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 85 (1) (Eng.); Race
Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 75 (1) (Eng.); Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch.
50, § 64 (1) (Eng.). The domestic discrimination statutes apply to both private and
public sectors, including the Crown. See id.
90. See Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 85 (1); Race Relations Act, 1976,
ch. 74, § 75 (1); Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, § 64 (1).
91. See Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, § 52 (1) (Eng.); Race Relations
Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 42 (1) (Eng.). Under the provisions of the Armed Forces Act
1996, members of the forces are permitted to bring claims of sex or race discrimi-
nation before the Industrial Tribunal. See Armed Services Act, 1996, ch. 46, §§ 21-
27 (Eng.).
92. See European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, § 2 (1) (Eng.). The United
Kingdom has undertaken to give supremacy to European Community Law wher-
ever there is a conflict between the principles of domestic (U.K.) law and those of
Community Law.; See Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport, [1989] 2
All E.R. 692. The decisions of the European Court of Justice are binding under
principles of international law, and the United Kingdom has a good record of com-
pliance. See JOSEPHINE STEINER & L. WOODS, TEXTBOOK ON EC LAw 66-71, 369-
71, 409-17 (1996).
93. Sept. 21, 1970, Europ. T.S. No. 5, Art. 8 (1950). The European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was drawn up by
the Council of Europe in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. See Bernhard
Schloh, The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 93, 113 (1998). It has now been ratified by 40 states, including many
former Communist, Eastern-block states. See id. It has been described as "the
quasi-constitutional bill of rights of a nascent, quasi-federal Europe." WINTEMUTE,
supra note 41, at 4.
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In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, discussed earlier, the Court ruled that
the criminalization of homosexual relations violated the right to respect for
private life under Article 8." The Commission, however, has since ruled
that homosexual relationships do not come within the right to respect for
family life.95 The failed challenge in Regina v. Ministry of Defence96 to the
government's policy to dismiss all homosexual service personnel has now
been referred to the Court under the same article, though it will be some time
before a decision is forthcoming.97 A particularly important development in
this area was the decision by the British Government in October 1997 to
publish a Human Rights Bill, which aims to incorporate the European Con-
vention on Human Rights into the domestic law of the United Kingdom.9"
The importance of this Bill is that provisions of the Convention will, for the
first time, be enforceable directly in the domestic courts." This piece of
human rights legislation will have an important impact on the protection of
gays and lesbians from governmental discrimination, given that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has already considered cases from several
countries where homosexual men have successfully complained about the
denial of their right to privacy under Article 8. "°
Turning to the European Union, the question of what protection Euro-
pean law gives against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation has
thus far been answered in a disappointing way. The European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) has recently ruled, for example, that sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is not a form of direct sex discrimination prohibited by the Equal Pay
94. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 54
(1982) (Commission report).
95. See Pieter van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, in Homosexuality: A European Community Issue, 26
INT'L STUD. HUM. RTS. 179 (1993). This has sharply narrowed the grounds that
can be argued under the Convention. See id. For example, immigration rights,
marriage rights, succession rights and accommodation rights have all been denied.
See id.
96. [1996] Q.B. 517 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.), aff/d, [1996] Q.B. 551 (Eng. C.A.).
97. See R. v. Secretary of State, [1997] I.R.L.R. 297, 299 (Q.B.).
98. Human Rights Bill (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/rights.htm>. At the time of writing of
this Article, the bill had passed through the House of Lords and was introduced in
the House of Commons on February 6, 1998. See House of Commons, Weekly In-
formation Bulletin (visited Feb. 7, 1998) <http://www.parliament.the-stationary-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmwib/wb980207/pub.htm>.
99. See Human Rights Bill, cls. 2-3 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/rights.htm>; TIMES (London), Jan. 19,
1998, at 5 (citing a speech made by Sir William Wade to a conference of judges and
lawyers at Cambridge University's Centre for Public Law, in which he expressed
his opinion that some individuals would bring their challenges directly to the
courts for the sake of their "more powerful remedies").
100. See Douglas Sanders, Constructing Lesbian and Gay Rights, CAN. J. L. &
Soc'y, Fall 1994, at 99, 103.
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Directive.'O' In the 1998 decision of Grant v South West Trains,1 2 the ECJ
ruled that denial of employment benefits for same-sex partners is not con-
trary to Article 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 3
In light of the Grant decision, the reference of another sexual orientation
case to the ECJ was withdrawn.) 4 These cases, mentioned here to illustrate
the topicality of sexual orientation litigation, are discussed in more detail
later in this Article. 105
Within the European Union, action to protect gay men and lesbians is
also being taken at the level of the Council of Ministers."° In October of
1997, a proposed revision to the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity 107 was signed by the member states.'0 8 Article 2(7) of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam provides for the insertion of a new Article 13 into the EC Treaty,
which will allow the Council of Ministers to "take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or be-
lief, disability, age or sexual orientation.' 9 However, this proposal requires
a unanimous vote by the Council of Ministers, acting on a proposal from the
Commission, after consulting the European Parliament."0 Even then, it
merely provides a legal base for the Council to initiate legislation or other
measures at some future date."' Given the great diversity that currently ex-
ists among the laws of member states of the European Union, it is unlikely
101. Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Application of the Principle of
Equal Pay for Men and Women, 1975 O.J. (L 45).
102. Case C-249/96, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621.
103. See id. at 1-653.
104. See R. v. Secretary of State for Defence, [1998] I.R.L.R. 508 (Q.B.).
105. See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text (discussing Grant v. South-
west Trains and R. v. Sec. of State for Defence).
106. See generally Mark Bell & Lisa Waddington, The 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference and the Prospects of a Non-Discrimination Treaty Article, 25 INDUS.
L.J. 320 (1996) (alerting readers to the controversy surrounding the addition of
sexual orientation to an existing non-discrimination provision of the Treaty);
Frances Russell, Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Europe, 145 NEW L.J. 374
(1996) (comparing legislation in the United Kingdom dealing with discrimination
based on sexual orientation with that of the rest of the European community).
107. Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter EC treaty].
108. See Treaty of Amsterdam (last modified Feb. 27, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/index.html>.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See EC Treaty, supra note 107, at Art. 189 (b), § 2.
111. See Catherine Barnard, The United Kingdom and the Amsterdam Treaty,
26 INDUS. L.J. 275, 281 (1997) (referring to presidential comments in a draft of the
treaty indicating that the provision is only an enabling measure, but noting that it
will ultimately be a matter of judicial interpretation to determine whether the
treaty gives more power). While Member States agreed upon the need for an anti-
discrimination clause, they did not agree upon the grounds of discrimination to be
included. See id. In particular, concerns were raised about the inclusion of dis-
ability and sexual orientation. See id. For this reason the clause is permissive
rather than mandatory. See id.
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that this will happen in the foreseeable future. Perhaps the proposal's great-
est significance for the present is its recognition that non-discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation should be a general principle of Community
law.
E. Conclusion
The recognition of homosexual equality rights vis 6 vis the state is of
foundational importance and counts as a critical step in the development of
human rights protection for gays and lesbians. This is because any law, and
particularly a national constitution, has the power both to impugn and le-
gitimize hatred... against an identifiable group. Second, given that the state
is embedded in society and "linked in thousands of ways to interests in soci-
ety," a governmental standard which is non-homophobic incrementally ad-
vances that same standard in the private sphere and, more specifically, can
provide momentum for the promulgation of human rights codes regulating
private sector behavior.' 3 Finally, liberal political theory acknowledges that
interference with the government's freedom to act as it sees fit is inherently
more palatable than interference with decisions taken by employers in the
private marketplace." 4 Hence, if the public sector is entitled to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation, there is no obvious principle upon which
the private sector could be held to a more restrictive standard.
III. Protection in the Private Sector Through Human Rights Legislation
A. Protection from Private Employment Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation in the United States
There is no federal protection in the United States against private em-
ployment discrimination based on sexual orientation, even though such leg-
islation would have the potential to alter significantly the employment land-
scape for lesbians and gay men."5 This absence, in turn, permits a wide
112. See KENNETH KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF
POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 186 (1993) (suggesting
that laws have a role in maintaining social order).
113. Alan Cairns, The Embedded State: State-Society Relations in Canada, in
STATE AND SOCIETY: CANADA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 53, 79 (Keith Banting
ed., 1986).
114. See generally Shannon Kathleen O'Byrne, Towards an Integrated, Liberal
Theory of the Canadian State, 33 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 1057 (1992) (analyzing the
broadly shared public values that call for a distinction between treatment of gov-
ernment and private institutions at common law).
115. An expansive reading of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include
same sex sexual harassment was successfully sought by the plaintiff in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). The Supreme
Court noted that with respect to "hostile environment" same-sex sexual harass-
ment cases, lower courts have taken a "bewildering variety of stances," including a
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disparity among states and localities. For example, virtually all states and
the District of Columbia have human rights legislation or state constitutional
provisions prohibiting some form of discrimination in the private sector.' 6
However, only ten specifically bar discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion,"' and approximately 126 localities have enacted anti-discrimination
ordinances."' This patchwork of protection, though constitutionally secure
as a result of Romer,"9 is seriously and obviously deficient.' 0
B. Protection from Private Employment Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation in Canada
In the private sector, Canada again takes the lead with respect to pro-
hibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. The vast
majority of Canadian provinces and territories have human rights legislation
prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation
either as a result of legislative enactment 121 or judicial fiat.'22 Additionally,
refusal to recognize any claim, recognizing only claims involving a homosexual
harasser, or recognizing claims regardless of the sexual orientation of the parties.
Id. While the parties to this suit were not homosexual, the Court's decision clearly
extended protection from sexual harassment to victims, regardless of sexual ori-
entation. See id.
116. See, e.g., Eric Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against
AIDS Victims: Falling Through the Gap in Federal Law, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1247, 1248 (1991) (explaining that all states prohibit employment discrimination
on the basis of disability).
117. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81a (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (1997);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 1 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1998); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-5-5 (1995 & Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (1997); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 111.36 (1997). In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 87
(1991), the California Court of Appeals found that homosexuality is the equivalent
of a political activity or association and, therefore, discrimination is prohibited un-
der the California Labor Code. Section 1101(b) prohibits employers from making,
adopting or enforcing any policy that tends to control or direct the political activi-
ties or affiliations of employees. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1998).
118. See James Button, et al., Where Local Laws Prohibit Discrimination, PUB.
MGMT., Apr. 1995, at 9, 10.
119. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (describing the usefulness of
the holding in Romer).
120. Recent events in the state of Maine clearly illustrate this deficiency. In
1997, the Maine legislature enacted legislation prohibiting, inter alia, employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552
(West 1964). In a procedure known as the "peoples veto", the law was repealed in
February of 1998 after an extensive grass roots campaign by the law's opponents.
See Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 1998, at Al, Al.
121. The Human Rights Act in British Columbia was amended in 1992 to pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. S.B.C., ch. 43 (1992) (Can.).
The same was done in Manitoba in 1987-1988, New Brunswick in 1992, Nova Sco-
tia in 1991, Ontario in 1986, Quebec in 1977, Saskatchewan in 1993, the Yukon in
1987 and federally in 1996. See R.S.M., ch. 45 (1987-1988) (Can.); R.S.N.B., ch. 30
(1992) (Can.); S.N.S., ch. 12 (1991) (Can.); S.O., ch. 64 (1986) (Can.); S.Q., ch. 6
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and as mentioned earlier, the federal Human Rights Act has recently been
amended to forbid such discrimination. 1 3 This means that where an individ-
ual has suffered private employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, he or she can make a complaint to an administrative agency es-
tablished by the legislation. 24 If, upon investigation, this administrative
body cannot secure a satisfactory resolution to the matter, a tribunal is con-
vened and mandated to adjudicate on the question of whether a prohibited
discriminatory practice has occurred and, if so, to order a remedy." 5
The province of Alberta, by way of contrast, has historically refused to
amend its human rights legislation, now known as the Human Rights, Citi-
zenship and Multiculturalism Act,12 so as to prohibit marketplace discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation. 27 The majority of the Alberta Court of
Appeals, in Vriend v. Alberta,12 ruled that this refusal did not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equality contained in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. 29 This ruling has recently been reversed by the Su-
preme Court of Canada." '
The Supreme Court expressly overturned Justice McClung's lead deci-
sion that legislative silences, omissions, or other forms of under-
inclusiveness are immune from constitutional scrutiny.' 3' The Supreme
(1977) (Can.); S.S., ch. 61 (1993) (Can.); S.Y.T., ch. 3 (1987) (Can.); COMMONS
DEBATES, supra note 22, at 552. For a comprehensive discussion of Canadian leg-
islative history in this area, see CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 21.
122. Four Canadian jurisdictions do not have human rights legislation expressly
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In Newfoundland
(Human Rights Commissionl v. Newfoundland (Minister of Employment and La-
bour Relations) (1995), 127 D.L.R. (4th) 694 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.), however, the court
ordered that Newfoundland's Human Rights Code be read as prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the grounds of sexual orientation, based on the reasoning, inter alia, of
Haig v. Canada (1992), 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1. Prince Edward Island's human rights
legislation does not expressly protect sexual orientation, but its human rights
commission does accept complaints alleging this kind of discrimination, based on
Haig. See CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 29-39. Neither the Alberta Human Rights,
Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act nor the Northwest Territories' Fair Practices
Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See R.S.A., ch. H-
11.7 (1996) (Can.); R.O.N.W.T., ch. F-2, §§ 3(1)-4(1) (1988) (Can.); see also
CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 29-39.
123. See Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6, §§ 1- 2. For a history of
the bill, see CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 24.
124. See CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 24.
125. See id. at 21-22.
126. S.A. ch. H-11.7.
127. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (noting Alberta's refusal to
include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination).
128. (1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595 (Alta. C.A.), rev'g [1994] 6 W.W.R. 414 (Q.B.).
129. See id. at 601. The court found that it was a valid legislative determina-
tion. See id. at 601-10.
130. See Vriend v. Alberta (1998), 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (deciding that omission
of sexual orientation from the Act denied gays and lesbians equal protection).
131. See id. at 412-13.
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Court also rejected his contention that any judicial review of Alberta's hu-
man rights legislation would be illegitimate for being anti-democratic.'32
Canada's highest court defended the constitutionally-mandated judicial role
of scrutinizing legislative and executive conduct for compliance with con-
stitutional values.'33 It reasserted and defended the judiciary's constitutional
obligation as trustees to assess government action "in the interests of the new
social contract that was democratically chosen" during the years leading up
to the patriation of the Canadian constitution.'
34
More specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that Alberta's failure to
protect homosexuals from discrimination in its very own human rights leg-
islation was patently contrary to the equality provision of the Charter. 35
Writing for a unanimous court on this point, Justice Cory stated that the leg-
islative exclusion at bar sent a message:
[I]t is permissible, and perhaps even acceptable, to discriminate against
individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation. The effect of that
message on gays and lesbians is one whose significance cannot be un-
derestimated. As a practical matter, it tells them that they have no pro-
tection from discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. De-
prived of any legal redress they must accept and live in constant fear of
discrimination. These are burdens which are not imposed on hetero-
sexuals.
Perhaps most important is the psychological harm which may ensue
from this state of affairs. Fear of discrimination will logically lead to
concealment of true identity and this must be harmful to personal confi-
dence and self-esteem. Compounding that effect is the implicit message
conveyed by the exclusion, that gays and lesbians, unlike other indi-
viduals, are not worthy of protection. This is clearly an example of a
distinction which demeans the individual and strengthens and perpe-
trates the view that gays and lesbians are less worthy of protection as
individuals in Canada's society. The potential harm to the dignity and
perceived worth of gay and lesbian individuals constitutes a particularly
cruel form of discrimination.' 3
6
Perhaps because the discrimination was so blatant and unjustifiable,
the Supreme Court agreed with the appellants and ordered that the Act im-
mediately be read as if it prohibited discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion. 37 Though section 33 of the Charter would permit the government to
"opt out" of having to follow the Supreme Court's ruling in this matter, the
132. See id. at 412, 439-40.
133. See id. Justice lacobucci, writing for a unanimous court on this point,
notes that this remedial role given to the judiciary was chosen by the Canadian
people "through their elected representatives as part of a redefinition of our de-
mocracy." Id. at 437-38.
134. Id. at 438.
135. See id. at 428.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 448.
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government caucus has stated that this option would not be exercised.'38 As
a result of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision, the individual who suf-
fers discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation anywhere in Canada is
entitled to make a complaint to the appropriate human rights tribunal and
seek redress through that administrative forum. 39
C. Protection from Private Employment Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation in the UK
In the U.K., only discrimination based on race, gender, religion or dis-
ability is outlawed. 4 There is no specific legislation which prohibits dis-
crimination on grounds of sexual orientation in either public or private em-
ployment. Recently, however, the argument has been advanced in U.K.
courts that sexual orientation discrimination is also sex discrimination,"' and
as such unlawful under the Sex Discrimination Act of 197542 and the Equal
Treatment Directive. 1
43
The first reported decision raising this argument was Regina v. Minis-
try of Defense ex parte Smith,' 44 in which four gay and lesbian members of
the armed forces challenged their dismissals as unlawful under the Equal
Treatment Directive. ,4' The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's re-
fusal to grant judicial review of the policy of discharging all service person-
nel known to be gay.'" The court adopted a very narrow, literal approach to
the interpretation of the European Directive and argued that it could not be
construed to cover dismissal on the grounds of sexual orientation because
this had not been in the minds of the drafters of the Directive in 1976.1
4 7
138. See Alberta Takes Out Ads on Gay Rights Ruling, NAT'L GEN. NEWS
(Ottawa), Apr. 14, 1998, available in QL System, CP98.
Note that section 33 of the Charter provides: "(1) Parliament or the legislature
of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as
the case may be, that the Act or provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a
provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the Charter." Vriend, 156
D.L.R. (4th) at 452. Section 15 is the equality provision which was violated in
Vriend. Id. at 386.
139. See Vriend, 156 D.L.R. (4th) at 386.
140. See generally Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 (Eng.); Race Relations
Act, 1976, ch. 74 (Eng.); Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50 (Eng.); Fair
Employment (NI) Act, 1989, ch. 32 (Eng.).
141. See infra notes 144-181 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to
discrimination based on sexual orientation under the two pieces of legislation).
142. 1975, ch. 65 (Eng.).
143. Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the Implementation of the Principle of
Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Voca-
tional Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, 1976 O.J. (L 39).
144. [1996] Q.B. 517, affd., [1996] Q.B. 551 (Eng. C.A.).
145. See id. at 523.
146. See id. at 517.
147. See id. at 543-44. Thorpe, L.J., of the Court of Appeal, stated: "[Any com-
mon sense construction of the Directive in the year of its issue leads in my judg-
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This may be literally true, but under European law the intention of the draft-
ers is not conclusive. 4 The English court refused to refer the case to the
ECJ on the grounds that European law was sufficiently clear in this area.'49
As indicated earlier, however, the matter will proceed to review before the
European Court of Human Rights. 50
In the second case, Smith v. Gardner Merchant,' a gay barman chal-
lenged his dismissal under the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975.152 The In-
dustrial Tribunal refused to accept the argument that the correct approach
was to compare the treatment of a gay man to that of a heterosexual woman,
that is, both were attracted to men, but only the gay man was subjected to
sanctions in the form of harassment.'53 The Employment Appeal Tribunal
(E.A.T.) further refused to refer the case to the ECJ although there were two
contentious issues: the choice of an appropriate comparator, and the ques-
tion of whether sexual orientation discrimination is also sex discrimina-
tion.'54 On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the court confirmed that discrimi-
nation on grounds of sexual orientation is not discrimination on the grounds
of sex within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act.'55 The court found
that a person's sexual orientation is not to be treated as an aspect of his or
her sex.'56 For the purposes of the Act, the proper comparison, where a male
employee has been harassed by reason of his sexual orientation, is with the
treatment of a female homosexual employee.' 57 The case was remitted to the
Tribunal to consider whether such an employee would have been treated any
ment to the inevitable conclusion that it was solely directed to gender discrimina-
tion and not to discrimination against sexual orientation." Id. at 565.
148. In Case 283/81, CILFIT v. Minister of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, at 3430,
the ECJ ruled that "every provision of Community law must be placed in its con-
text and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole,
regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on
which the provision in question is to be applied." (emphasis added). The question of
the intention of the drafters was not even asked by the ECJ in the case which de-
cided that pregnancy discrimination was also sex discrimination. See Case C-
177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen Plus, 1991
E.C.R. 1-3941.
149. See Regina, [1996] Q.B. at 560, 565.
150. See id.
151. [1996] I.C.R. 790 (E.A.T.), appeal allowed, [1998] 3 All E.R. 852, 875 (C.A.).
152. See id. at 791.
153. See id. The Industrial Tribunal refused to hear the case based on lack of
jurisdiction under the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. See id. at 792. The decision
may go against the provisions of the Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment issued
by the European Commission, which states that verbal conduct of a sexual nature
does not lose its sexual character merely because it is directed towards a homosex-
ual. See Commission Recommendation 24/2/92 of 27 November 1991 on the Pro-
tection of the Dignity of Men and Women at Work, Code of Practice, § 1, 1992 O.J.
(L 49) 1.
154. See Smith, [1996] I.C.R. at 793-94.
155. See Smith v. Gardner Merchant, [1998] 3 All E.R. 852, 852 (C.A.).
156. See id. at 863.




A case which raised the possibility that European Law might receive a
wider interpretation that the domestic British legislation was the important
decision of the ECJ in P. v. S.,' 59 a case concerning the dismissal of a trans-
sexual manager. In this case, the ECJ adopted a purposive approach to the
Equal Treatment Directive:
To tolerate ... discrimination [based on transsexuality] would be tan-
tamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and
freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the court has a duty to
safeguard .... [The Directive is] simply the expression, in the relevant
field, of the principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of Community law .... Accordingly, the scope of the directive
cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a
person is of one or other sex. 
160
The case of P. v S. opened up the possibility that, since the Directive
prohibits employment discrimination against transsexual persons, it may also
prohibit such discrimination against gay, lesbian and bi-sexual persons and
against same-sex couples. Unfortunately, this possibility has been all but
eliminated as a result of the Court of Justice's ruling in Grant v. South-West
Trains.'6 ' As discussed earlier,'62 Grant raised the issue of sexual orientation
discrimination as a form of prohibited sex discrimination under Article 119
of the EC Treaty and specifically challenged the employer's pay policy
which provided certain travel benefits for a cohabitee of the opposite sex but
refused those benefits to a cohabitee of the same gender.'63 The Advocate
General recommended that the Court hold that this policy constitutes dis-
crimination based on gender and therefore is contrary to the provisions of the
EC Treaty."'6 He stated that the travel benefit was "dependent on the gender
of the employee inasmuch as employees must be of the opposite sex to their
cohabitees .... Gender is thus, objectively, the factor that leads to pay dis-
crimination against a particular group of employees."' 65 Regrettably, how-
ever, the Court declined to follow the Advocate General's recommenda-
tion. 166
A judicial determination in accordance with this recommendation
would have had a significant impact on marketplace policies which, hereto-
fore, have discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. It would have
158. See id. at 867.
159. Case C-13/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143.
160. Id. at 1-2165.
161. Case C-249/96, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621.
162. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
163. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-622.
164. See id. at 1-635 (opinion of Advocate General Michael B. Elmer).
165. 76 EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REV. 2 (1997) (report of the Advocate General's
opinion).
166. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-653.
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paved the way for much broader protection against discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation in the workplace throughout the European Union,
affecting an estimated thirty-five million people in total.' 67 Employers
would have been required to scrutinize their policies on pay-related benefits,
including pensions and health care for possible discrimination. Furthermore,
dismissals and refusals to appoint, promote or train gay people would have
been unlawful.
The ECJ ruled against Ms. Grant for three reasons. 6 First, the court
ruled that the condition which required a worker to live in a stable relation-
ship with a person of the opposite sex in order to benefit from travel conces-
sions was a condition that applied
regardless of the sex of the worker concerned. Thus travel concessions
are refused to a male worker if he is living with a person of the same
sex, just as they are to a female worker if she is living with a person of
the same sex. Since the condition imposed by the undertaking's regu-
lations applies in the same way to female and male workers, it cannot be
regarded as constituting discrimination directly based on sex.'
6 9
In these terms, the ECJ accepted that the appropriate comparator for a
lesbian woman is a gay man, and not a heterosexual man. The fallacy in the
ECJ's reasoning is neatly encapsulated in a 1995 assertion by Robert Win-
temute: "because an individual's sexual orientation can only be defined by
reference to the sex of the individual (and a couple's by reference to the
sexes of its members), distinctions based on sexual orientation necessarily
involve distinctions based on the sexes of individuals."'
70
Second, the court deferred to the value of permitting divergent views
within the EU. 17' Hence, in considering whether Community law requires
that same-sex relationships should be regarded by all employers as equiva-
lent to marriages or other stable opposite sex relationships, the court took the
view that it was "for the legislature alone to adopt, if appropriate, measures
which may affect that position."'1 72 In this context the Court observed that
when the Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force, 73 the Council of Ministers
167. See id. at 1-633.
168. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-645 to 1-647.
169. Id. at 1-646.
170. Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination:
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334, 347
(1997).
171. The lack of consensus among the Member States was argued before the
ECJ by the governments of the United Kingdom and France. See Grant, 1998
E.C.R. at 1-647. The Court's own view was that this lack of consensus was evi-
dence that relationships between persons of the same sex are not regarded in the
same way as relationships between persons of the opposite sex, and consequently
Community law does not require the two to be treated as equivalent. See id.
172. Id. at 1-648.
173. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 108. Under Article 14 of the Treaty, it
must now be ratified by the fifteen High Contracting Parties, in accordance with
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would be able to take measures with a view to eliminating various forms of
discrimination, including that based on sexual orientation.'74
Finally, the Court addressed whether, in light of its earlier decision in
P v. S, concerning gender reassignment, discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation could be treated as discrimination based on sex.'75 The Court
adopted a very restrictive approach to the earlier case, taking the view that
the reasoning in P v. S must be "limited to the case of a worker's gender re-
assignment and does not therefore apply to differences of treatment based on
a person's sexual orientation."'76 Thus, the court declined to follow the step
taken in P v. S, away from an interpretation of the Equal Treatment Directive
based purely on traditional comparisons between male and female employ-
ees, thereby permitting continued discrimination against persons based
solely on their sexual orientation."'
Another important case in this area is R. v. Secretary of State, which
challenges the validity of the governmental policy barring gays and lesbians
from the armed forces.178 More specifically, it asks whether this policy can
be justified under Article 2(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive,'79 on the
grounds that homosexuality is incompatible with service in the armed
forces."' Unfortunately, in light of the ECJ's decision in Grant, the court
found that the policy did not violate the Equal Treatment Directive.''
their respective constitutional requirements. See id. at art. 14. The Treaty shall
enter into force on the first day of the second month following ratification by the
last signatory state. See id.
174. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-651.
175. See id. at 1-648 to 1-651.
176. Id. at 1-650. The argument appears to be based not so much on logic as on
the pragmatic consideration that a very small number of people will undertake
gender reassignment, compared to the 35 million homosexual people living in the
EU according to the estimate of A-G Elmer. See id. at 1-633.
177. See id. at 1-653 ('The refusal by an employer to allow travel concessions to
the person of the same sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship ... does
not constitute discrimination prohibited by Article 119 of the EC Treaty or Council
Directive 75/117/EEC ... ").
178. [1997] I.R.L.R. 297 (Q.B.).
179. See id. Article 2(2) of the Directive states: "This Directive shall be without
prejudice to the right of Member States to exclude from its field of application
those occupational activities ... for which, by reason of their nature or the context
in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining fac-
tor." Council Directive 76/207/EEC, art. 2, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 2. In Case C-222/84,
Johnson v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651,
1687, the ECJ ruled that the exception must be strictly and narrowly construed
and that the Member States do not enjoy unfettered discretion in invoking the ar-
ticle.
180. See Perkins, [1997] I.R.L.R. at 297. Robert Wintemute is of the opinion
that a "national security" justification is likely to carry little weight in the ECJ,
because the majority of EU member states do not ban lesbian, gay or bisexual per-
sons from the armed forces. See WINTEMUTE, supra note 41, at 352.
181. See Perkins, [1998] I.R.L.R. 508 (Q.B.). In reference to a letter from the
ECJ requesting that in light of Grant, the referring judge consider whether he
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The introduction of a statutory action for unfair dismissal' 82 has se-
verely curtailed the freedom of an employer to terminate the contract of em-
ployment. In order to claim statutory protection, an employee would first
have to establish two years' continuous employment with the same em-
ployer.'83 An employee without this qualification can be dismissed quite
lawfully for no reason at all, or on any grounds, including the fact that he or
she is gay.' 84 Employers thus have two years in which to weed out
"unsuitable" employees. An employee with the required service can be
fairly dismissed for any of five specified "fair" reasons, most relevant among
which, for present purposes, are "misconduct" and "some other substantial
reason."'
185
There appear to be only six reported cases in which dismissed homo-
sexuals have tried to use the unfair dismissal legislation to secure redress, the
latest of which was heard in 1981. 186 Generally, the reason advanced by the
employer for the dismissal has been misconduct, often following a criminal
conviction for gross indecency (outside the workplace) rather than for homo-
sexuality per se.'8 7 The twin themes of gay men posing a threat to young
people in their care, and of those working with young people having to pro-
vide acceptable role models, are also very much to the fore in the decisions.
In Saunders v. Scottish National Camps Associations, for example, a
Scottish appellate court accepted that an employer is entitled to assume,
without any form of scientific evidence being required, that a gay employee
poses special risks to young persons, even where his work (as a handyman at
a summer camp) did not involve him coming into direct contact with
wished to withdraw the reference, Mr. Justice Lightman responded "Albeit reluc-
tantly, I consider that I am bound to withdraw the reference in this case." See id.
182. This was done initially in the ill-fated Industrial Relations Act of 1971. Ch.
72, § 22 (Eng.). The provisions are now contained in section 98 of the Employment
Rights Act, 1996, ch. 18, § 98 (Eng.).
183. See id. § 108.
184. See id.
185. See id. § 98. The five reasons are: the capability or qualifications of the
employee; the conduct of the employee; the redundancy of the employee; the fact
that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without
contravention (either on his part or on the part of the employer) of a restriction or
duty imposed by or under a statute; or some other substantial reason. See id.
186. See Wiseman v. Salford City Council, [1981] I.R.L.R. 202 (E.A.T.)
(regarding the dismissal of a gay teacher); Saunders v. Scottish Nat'l Camps Ass'ns
Ltd., [1980] I.R.L.R. 174 (E.A.T.), appeal dismissed, [1981] I.R.L.R. 277 (Sess.)
(regarding the dismissal of a maintenance handyman); Bell v. Devon & Cornwall
Police Auth., [1978] I.R.L.R. 283 (Ind. T.) (regarding the dismissal of a gay cook
employed in the police canteen); Nottinghamshire County Council v. Bowly, [1978]
I.R.L.R. 252 (E.A.T.) (regarding the dismissal of a gay teacher of thirty years'
standing); Boychuk v. Symons Holdings Ltd., [19771 I.R.L.R. 395 (E.A.T.)
(regarding the dismissal of an audit clerk who insisted on wearing a badge pro-
claiming "Lesbians Ignite"); Gardiner v. Newport County Borough Council, [1974]
I.R.L.R. 262 (E.A.T.) (regarding the dismissal of a gay teacher).
187. See, e.g., Wiseman, [1981] I.R.L.R. at 202; Bell, [1978] I.R.L.R. at 283.
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them."'8 In other cases, the defenses of client prejudice and of business ne-
cessity have been successfully advanced by the employer, and are clearly a
significant weakness of the unfair dismissal action. 9 Unfair dismissal leg-
islation is also very limited in scope in that it offers no protection against re-
fusal to appoint, or other forms of victimization or harassment which fall
short of constructive dismissal.
D. Conclusion
Laurence Helfer and Alice Miller have recently noted that human
rights legislation is very important to homosexual equality issues. 19° This
importance lies not merely in its power to correct an unfair outcome, such as
providing a remedy to individuals who are refused private employment be-
cause of their sexual orientation, but in its power to effect change in how
homosexual individuals are regarded. 19' As Helfer and Miller state in the
context of international human rights:
The value of human rights law to lesbians and gay men lies principally
in its ability to transform awareness about sexual practices, intimate re-
lationships, and homosexual identity into claims against governments
for recognition and protection. By locating sexual orientation within a
set of rights claims, lesbians and gay men can link their struggle to a
tradition that has transformed a panoply of basic human needs into
rights respected under domestic and international law. 1
92
Such legislation is even more important because, as the next section
will show, the common law is woefully deficient in protecting gay and les-
bian employees from discrimination.
188. [1980] I.R.L.R. at 175.
189. See id. (considering the parents' reactions toward a homosexual handyman
at a summer camp); Boychuk, [1977] I.R.L.R. at 396 (defending dismissal of a les-
bian for wearing badges declaring lesbian slogans that "could be expected to be of-
fensive to fellow-employees and customers). Such defenses would not succeed in a
discrimination action. In James v. Eastleigh Borough Council, [1990] 2 A.C. 751
(H.L.), Lord Lowry gave the following example: "[I]f the foreman dismisses an effi-
cient and co-operative black road sweeper in order to avoid industrial action by the
remaining (white) members of the squad, he treats him less favourably on racial
grounds." Id. at 297.
190. See Hefler & Miller, supra note 47 (stating that, in the last decade, there
has been an important new trend in international law: legal advocacy to protect
the fundamental rights of lesbians and gay men).
191. See id.
192. Id. at 85.
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IV. Protections at Common Law for Employment Discrimination Based
on Sexual Orientation
A. Introduction
The common law stands as the only source of redress for marketplace
discrimination in jurisdictions lacking statutory human rights protection.
This imposes two immediate problems. First, the common law cannot act
prophylactically. At best, a common law claim for damages is heard by a
court to redress a wrong that has already been committed. Given that
Americans have not shown a strong national consensus that discrimination
based on sexual orientation ought to be prohibited, it is unlikely that even a
few successful common law cases would have the effect of reducing anti-
homosexual hiring practices. Second, there is no clear cause of action in
which discrimination based on sexual orientation could be pled in any of the
jurisdictions under analysis. This is of particular concern because, although
the common law can be expanded to accommodate novel claims, judges are
rarely willing to do so absent supportive legislative or policy directives. 93
The following sections will explore possible causes of action through
which homosexuals might secure legal redress in response to marketplace
discrimination. It will be seen that the United States has the largest body of
potentially applicable case law, perhaps because American constitutional and
statutory human rights protections are so meager. Conversely, Canada has
few applicable common law protections, but this is because there are consid-
erable constitutional and statutory protections already in place. Finally, the
United Kingdom appears to have the least developed common law for pro-
tection against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
B. The United States
1. Introduction
With no general common law prohibition against discrimination, ho-
mosexuals in the U.S. who have suffered marketplace discrimination gener-
ally would look to contract or tort law for a cause of action.'94 In contract
law, circumstances may permit an action for wrongful termination or breach
of an implied covenant of good faith.195 In tort, there may be potential in the
developing areas of wrongful or abusive discharge from employment and
193. See generally Richard L. Alfred & Ben T. Clements, The Public Policy Ex-
ception to the At Will Employment Rule, 78 MASS. L. REV. 88 (1993).
194. See Mary C. Dunlap, Employment, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw
5-35 to 5-37 (Roberta Achtenberg & Karen Moulding eds., 1997) (suggesting pur-
suit of state common law remedies due to the lack of federal remedies).
195. See id. at 5-38.8 to 5-38.9.
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invasion of privacy. 9 6 Although judges tend to resist extending the law be-
yond its existing boundaries, 9 ' it is also true that incremental advances in the
common law could play a role, albeit a limited one, in securing greater pro-
tections for lesbians and gay men in the paid workforce.
2. Breach of Contract
a. Challenging Dismissal
In the area of private employment, states have generally followed the
employment at-will doctrine, which presumes that employment relationships
are for an indefinite period, and either party can terminate the relationship
for any reason or for no reason at all.' 98 Accordingly, homosexuals who are
fired from their jobs based on sexual orientation could not advance a claim
of wrongful discharge in contract, absent an express or implied contract term
to the contrary. 99 However, a plaintiff who is discharged from employment
because of his or her sexual orientation may have a claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the right facts.2°° This is
an emerging area of contract law, which is derived in part from the duty of
good faith that is imposed on all contracts for the sale of goods by the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC).20 ' For example, many courts have adapted
the principles of the UCC to non-Code cases involving real estate, insurance
and service contracts. 2 Building on these inroads, Mary Dunlap suggests
that the breach of the duty to act in good faith is an appropriate cause of ac-
tion for plaintiffs who have suffered harassment or reputation damage as a
consequence of the employer's response to learning of the plaintiff's sexual
orientation.2 3
In most states, the covenant of good faith is associated with a contrac-
196. See id. at 5-38.2 to 5-38.8.
197. See, e.g., Schilling v. Bedford Mem'l Hosp., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983). In
some compelling circumstances, however, a court may be persuaded to extend the
common law. See, e.g., Naacash v. Burger, 29 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
198. See Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Lim-
iting Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967).
199. See id. at 1420-21.
200. See id.
201. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1996) ("Every contract or duty imposed within this Act im-
poses an obligation of good faith performance or enforcement."). The UCC has
been adopted in some form by all states. See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Inter-
ests: Where IP and Commerce Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1658 (1996).
202. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (awarding plaintiff one
million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages for the defendant's breach
of the covenant of good faith when the defendant's agent failed to submit her
health insurance premiums to the company, thus depriving the plaintiff of needed
medical coverage); J.R. Waymire Co. v. Anteres Corp., 975 S.W.2d 243, 247-78 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1998) (applying U.C.C. principles to a real estate transaction).
203. See Dunlap, supra note 194, at 5-38.9.
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tual relationship.2" Before an action can be brought for its breach, therefore,
the plaintiff must be able to establish the existence of a contract. Contractual
duties may be established in what would otherwise be an employment at-will
situation, if the employer has provided manuals, handbooks or other materi-
als to the employee which contain policy statements, rules or procedures for
addressing grievances."05 These, in turn, may create a subsidiary contractual
arrangement that changes the "at-will" nature of the initial relationship.c
6
However, the presumption in favor of at-will employment is still quite strong
in a number of jurisdictions.2 °7 In a Virginia case, for example, an employee
handbook which specifically stated that the employer would not terminate
any employee without just cause was held to have been superseded by a
form, signed by the employee, acknowledging receipt of the handbook and
containing a contradictory statement that the employment relationship was
at-will and could be terminated at any time by either party.2°8 The clear ir-
reconcilable conflict between the handbook and the form was found to be
insufficient to overcome the presumption that the employment relationship
was at-will.21
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith is recognized only by
about one-quarter of the states, and, given the absence of precedent, even
fewer of those would be likely to recognize it in the context of a claim for
damages resulting from termination of employment due to sexual orienta-
tion. 21 The additional infirmity of this line of argument is that it presumes
that sexual orientation is not a proper ground for dismissal of an employee.
Given the lack of statutory protection against discrimination based on sexual
orientation, and given homophobic prejudice in the U.S., this may not be a
realistic assumption.
204. See, e.g., Ryczek v. Guest Services, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995).
This case, in addition to raising the issue of breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, also addresses constructive discharge. See id. at 757. While the
court recognized each of these claims, it found that this plaintiff, a co-op student,
was at best an at-will employee who did not have an employment contract with the
defendant, and therefore, these causes of action would not stand, despite the egre-
gious behavior of her supervisor. See id. at 762. The plaintiffs claim based on
same-sex sexual harassment was likewise dismissed due to remedial action taken
by the defendant. See id. at 758-60.
205. See Helle v. Landmark, 472 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ohio 1984) (holding that em-
ployment at will "is only a description of the parties' prima facie employment rela-
tionship," and that employment manuals can create a binding contract).
206. See id.
207. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983)
(discussing the employee at-will doctrine and the public policy exception).
208. See Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d 428 (Va. 1992).
209. See id. at 431.
210. See Dunlap, supra note 194, at 5-38.9 and cases cited therein.
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b. Challenging the Refusal to Hire
Refusal to hire because of an applicant's sexual orientation creates no
contractual cause of action. The equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel,
however, may play a role in holding employers accountable for employment
related promises. 1' For example, if an employee were given a promise of
employment or promotion, and on the basis of that promise, refused other
employment and relocated, the employer might be liable for damages re-
sulting from the withdrawal of the job offer, even though no contract was
ever formed.212 However, the employee would have to show that his or her
reliance on the promise was reasonable,2"3 and that the employer's decision
to terminate the offer upon learning of the employee's sexual orientation was
unjust-two significant and perhaps insurmountable hurdles." 4
3. Tort Actions:
a. Challenging dismissal through public policy and abusive
discharge
The 1980s saw the emergence of a public policy exception to the em-
ployment at-will rule.2"' This exception applies to cases involving the re-
taliatory termination of employees who refuse to violate statutes or who ex-
ercise rights afforded by legislative policy or statutes.216 For example,
damages could be awarded to an employee who was fired for filing a work-
ers' compensation claim 217 or reporting a safety violation to the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration,2 18 or filing a charge of unfair labor prac-
tices under the National Labor Relations Act.219 Although many of the
211. The Restatement of Contracts defines promissory estoppel as follows: "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1977)
212. See AMY KASTELY, ET AL., CONTRACT LAW 393-400 (1996).
213. See Root v. PCC Airfoils, Inc., Nos. 73149, 73150, 73151, 73402, 73403,
73404, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4652, at *23-30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
neither an employee's reliance on an employee handbook nor the employee's con-
tinued employment constituted the requisite reliance for enforcement of a promise
by the employer of continued employment).
214. See KASTELY, supra note 212, at 471.
215. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983)
(finding that both contract and tort actions protecting workers who are wrongfully
discharged under the circumstances are not covered by any legislation).
216. See id. at 839 (noting that the public policy exception is recognized in cases
where the employee is discharged for refusing to violate a statute).
217. See id. at 839 (citing Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas. Co., 297 N.E.2d 425
(Ind. 1973)).
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994); Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 839.
219. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1994); see N.L.R.B. v. Hearst, 102 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.
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above-mentioned statutes prohibit retaliatory firings, courts have held that
they do not create a private right of action for damages.22 Rather, these
statutes are judicially regarded as articulating an important public policy.22'
Because any retaliation against the employee would be a violation of that
policy, it is actionable at common law.222
The public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine has
gained wide acceptance by state courts.223 Wrongful discharge cases have
been brought as exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine when the fir-
ing resulted from a complaint of employment discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act or state "whistle blower statutes, 224 which protect employees
from retaliation by their employers if they report unsafe or illegal conditions
to proper authorities.22
A few states have recognized termination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation as a violation of the public policy of nondiscrimination.226 Ironically,
at the very time this exception to the employment at-will doctrine is being
recognized in a few states, employers contend that human rights statutes
provide the exclusive remedy and abrogate the common law tort of wrongful
discharge.227 In those few states where human rights legislation includes a
1939).
220. See, e.g., Hearst, 102 F.2d at 664 (stating that Congress did not intend to
create any private right of action under the National Labor Relations Act).
221. See Brockrneyer, 335 N.W.2d at 838-39 (stating that discharged employees
are allowed to recover if the termination violates a well-established and important
public policy like a statute).
222. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427-28 (Ind. 1973)
(explaining that retaliatory discharge for filing a workman's compensation claim is
a wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law).
223. See Brockneyer, 335 N.W.2d at 839 n.10 (citing Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978); Trombeta v. Detroit, T & I.R.R., 265 N.W.2d
385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1978)).
224. See, e.g., Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283-84 (Utah 1992)
(holding that the public policy exception to employment at-will is a tort claim,
rather than a contract claim because it is imposed by law rather than by agree-
ment of the parties).
225. See Cynthia Estlund, The Changing Workplace: Wrongful Discharge Protec-
tions in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1659-61 n.20 (1996) (referring to
these well established exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine as the "bad
motive").
226. See, e.g., Kovatch v. California Cas. Management Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th
1256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Cataline v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 638 A.2d 1341,
1348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (noting that under New Jersey law, it is un-
lawful for an employer to refuse to hire or discharge any employee on the basis of
their sexual orientation).
227. Recently, the Virginia Supreme Court retreated from this public policy ar-
gument in Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 441 (Va. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff
could not bring a common law action of wrongful termination based on the fact
that she was fired because of pregnancy). The following question was certified by
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia: "Does Vir-
ginia Code § 2.1-725(D) [part of the state human rights act] prohibit a common law
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prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation, the statutory
remedy is generally available through an administrative procedure similar to
the procedure in place for violations of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2 ' The
Supreme Courts of Maryland 9 and New Jersey 230 have adopted this view,
while the California Supreme Court has taken the opposite view that com-
mon law remedies are still available to plaintiffs. T3
As noted earlier, a minority of states have specific statutory protections
against discrimination based on sexual orientation. 32 The majority of states
cause of action based upon the public policies reflected in the Virginia Human
Rights Act, Va. Code § 2.1-714 et seq.?" Id. at 442-43. Section 2.1-725(D), passed
by the Virginia General Assembly in 1995, states in pertinent part: "Causes of ac-
tion based upon the public policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively
limited to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable
federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances." Id. at 444-45. The court
interpreted this amendment as abolishing the common law claim for wrongful dis-
charge based on a violation of the public policy of the state of Virginia, as ex-
pressed in the human rights amendment. See id. at 446. This leaves plaintiffs
without any remedy if their case does not fit within any of the federal or state
statutory schemes. The Virginia Human Rights Act does not prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, but this decision would arguably foreclose any
common law claim for wrongful discharge on account of unlawful discrimination.
See id. at 445 (quoting the Virginia Human Rights Act as prohibiting discrimina-
tion based only on race, color, religion, national origin or sex, or age if the em-
ployee is forty years or older).
A contrary position was taken on the same issue by the Ontario Court of Jus-
tice in Lehman v. Davis, No. C22568/93, 1993 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 2599 (Ont. Ct. Gen.
Div.). The plaintiff filed an action for damages for constructive dismissal based on
her demotion. See id. at * 1-2. She alleged that the demotion was a result of her
complaint about sexual harassment. See id. at *1. Significantly, she had earlier
filed a complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code, but no action had been
taken on her complaint when her civil action for constructive dismissal came to
trial. See id. According to the court, this was no impediment to proceeding with
the civil action because, the court stated, her cause of action existed independently
of legislation. See id. at *18-19. Further, there existed "a demonstrated prejudice
resulting from an inability to obtain a speedy remedy through the board [set up
pursuant to the Human Rights Code.]" Id. at *19. For a similar decision, see White
v. Bay-Shep Restaurant & Tavern Ltd. (1995), 16 C.C.E.L. (2d) 57 (Ont. Ct. Jus.
Gen. Div.).
228. See Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994)
(providing that a plaintiff must first bring a complaint to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission). If the Commission investigates the case, the claimant
must pursue the administrative remedies. See id. at § 2000e-5(f). After 180 days,
if the Commission has not acted, the claimant is free to file a lawsuit. See id.
229. See Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 587 A.2d 569
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (noting that remedies available under statutes prohibit-
ing wrongful discharge preclude any common law action).
230. See Cataline, 638 A.2d at 1349 (holding that common law causes of action
may not go to a jury when a statutory remedy exists).
231. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 383 (Cal. 1990) (holding that the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act does not displace any available causes of action and
remedies).
232. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (naming states that have such
legislation).
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have enacted human rights legislation modeled after the Federal Civil Rights
Act,233 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 234 and the Americans
With Disabilities Act.235 Many state courts have been reluctant to find a
public policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation when the
state legislative body has not acted.236 Typical of these cases, the federal
court in Pennsylvania stated:
With respect to the employee-Plaintiffs' allegations regarding wrongful
discharge based on sexual orientation... Plaintiffs have failed to estab-
lish a clearly mandated public policy which would provide an exception
to the general at-will employment doctrine. Because the employee-
Plaintiffs cannot pursue their wrongful discharge claims as public pol-
icy exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine . . . their
claims for wrongful discharge shall be dismissed.
237
However, in two recent cases, the courts have expanded the notion of
what public policy entails.238  In Painter v. Graley,239 the Ohio Supreme
Court stated:
Clear public policy sufficient to justify an exception to the employment
at-will doctrine is not limited to public policy expressed by the general
assembly in the form of statutory enactments, but may also be discerned
as a matter of law based on other sources, such as Constitutions of Ohio
and the United States, administrative rules and regulation and the com-
mon law.
240
Likewise, in Sarff v. Continental Express,24 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas stated that:
This court deeply believes that discrimination against all Americans,
despite their gender, race, religion or sexual orientation, is profoundly
wrong and that it violates the fundamental and essential right of indi-
viduals to engage in the full rights and privileges of citizenship. In ad-
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, na-
tional origin and religion under any program receiving federal financial assis-
tance).
234. 29 U.S.C. § 621(4)(b) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination of workers over 40
years of age).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities and requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodation for
those employees).
236. See Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F. Supp. 949, 957 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (reasoning that
claims of wrongful discharge based on sexual orientation and pregnancy are not a
clearly mandated public policy).
237. Id.
238. See Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(noting that the court is bound by Title VII rules that do not prohibit sexual dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation); Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio
1994) (noting that the existence of such a public policy may be discerned by the
Ohio and United States Constitutions, legislation and administrative rules and
regulations, and the common law).
239. 639 N.E.2d at 56.
240. Id.
241. 894 F. Supp. at 1076.
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dition, it makes little economic sense for employers to discriminate
against the 15-25 million gay and lesbian people in this country, many
of whom hold positions at the highest levels of professional, scientific,
academic and political enterprises.
242
One might optimistically view these two statements as the earliest in-
dicators of a public policy prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation. Judicial notions of public policy provide the basis for several long
standing exceptions to enforcement of private contractual promises.243 In the
future, plaintiffs seeking damages for wrongful discharge based on sexual
orientation may be able to argue successfully that a public policy exception
to the employment at-will rule has been expressed by the courts, even in ju-
risdictions where the legislature has not acted.2"
One commentator has argued that the wrongful discharge exceptions
to employment at-will should be replaced altogether.245 Instead of asking
whether the employer had a "bad motive" for the dismissal, employers
would have to show a "just cause" for the dismissal.246 Such a shift is far
more than a matter of semantics, as it radically changes the underlying doc-
trine of at-will employment.247 As Estlund argues:
242. Id. at 1080.
243. See, e.g., Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1992) (noting
that courts have articulated their own standards for the enforceability of exculpa-
tory clauses and non-competition clauses, and have established standards for de-
termining when contracts are unenforceable because they are unconscionable).
244. At the same time that some courts seem to be moving forward towards pro-
tection of gays and lesbians in the workplace, another issue has precipitated a
backlash that may be the basis of a public policy not to offer this protection. See
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 44 (Haw. 1993). In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that the constitution of the state of Hawaii may have been violated by a state
law defining the marriage ceremony as one between man and woman. See id. Al-
though this decision significantly impacts the rights and benefits of married per-
sons, holding that the constitution requires such a fundamental and personal right
to be extended to gay and lesbian couples is certainly an indication of a public pol-
icy in Hawaii to afford all rights, including freedom from discrimination in em-
ployment, to lesbians and gay men. See id.
In response to the Hawaii Supreme Court Decision, the Congress of the
United States passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as the
union between a man and a woman. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
100, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). Also in response to this decision, sixteen states have
adopted legislation that refuses to recognize same-sex marriages entered into pur-
suant to the laws of other states. See Diane M. Guillerman, The Defense of Mar-
riage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex
Marriage, 34 HOUS. L. REv. 425, 440-41 (1997). This will ultimately raise a ques-
tion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which re-
quires all states to recognize valid legal acts of all other states. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1. While these laws do not directly affect remedies for employment discrimi-
nation, they may pose a significant barrier to the argument that a state has evi-
denced a clear public policy of non-discrimination against gays and lesbians.
245. See Estlund, supra note 225, at 1669-87.
246. Id.
247. There is already a body of law on what constitutes just cause for dismissal
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Fair treatment should not be or appear to be a special privilege. The
time may have come to move from the old rule of unfettered employer
discretion, riddled as it now is with exceptions, to a new rule of fair
treatment. A requirement of just cause for discharge and a fair process
for enforcing it would help to realize the policies underlying the exist-
ing exceptions to employment at-will while responding to the con-
cerns- both the valid concerns and those that are understandable but
exaggerated-of those who do not normally qualify for any of those ex-
ceptions.
248
In other words, by changing the employment paradigm as Estlund
suggests, courts may find it easier to articulate a public policy that protects
gay and lesbian employees from unjust termination.
b. Breach ofprivacy
Over one hundred years ago, Justice Brandeis defined the constitu-
tional right of privacy as "the right to be let alone." '249 This right is protected
in the Constitution as well as in legislative provisions.25 °
in the state administrative structures governing unemployment compensation for
workers who have been terminated or quit their jobs. See Hank v. Safari Hair Ad-
venture, 512 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Masterson v. Boliden-Allis, Inc.,
865 P.2d 1031 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). In order to receive benefits, a claimant must
establish that she or he was fired without good cause, or left the employment for
good cause. See Hank, 512 N.W.2d at 614 (left for good cause); Masterson, 865
P.2d at 1031 (fired without good cause). In a Minnesota case, an employee quit her
job after being subjected to harassment based on her sexual orientation and, after
seeking assistance but receiving none from her employer, was found to have had
good cause for leaving her employment and was thus entitled to benefits. See
Hank, 512 N.W.2d at 615-18.
248. Estlund, supra note 225, at 1682.
249. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
250. Privacy is protected by the United States Constitution, state constitutions
and legislation. The application of these provisions depends on what kind of pri-
vacy is at issue and who is invading it. While a right to privacy is not explicitly
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Con-
necticut law that banned the distribution of contraceptive devices, Justice Douglas
stated that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give each of them life and substance
[and] various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
The Court went on to find that the activity at issue in that case was within the
"zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at
485.
For a statutory example of privacy protection, see the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1998) ("ECPA"). This statute was at
issue in a recent case of Timothy McVeigh (unrelated to the Oklahoma City
bombing defendant) a senior Navy enlisted man who brought suit against the Sec-
retary of Defense to challenge his discharge from the Navy because he was gay.
See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). McVeigh's sexual orienta-
tion was suspected as a result of an e-mail message from alias "boysrch" and his
personal profile used with the alias. Id. Judge Sporkin of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia granted McVeigh's request for an injunction on the
basis of the probable finding that the Navy violated its own "Don't Ask Don't Tell
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The common law also protects against invasions of privacy, and pro-
vides a framework hospitable to claims of employer misconduct with respect
to an employee's sexual orientation.251
Dean William Prosser organized the extensive case law on the com-
mon law right of privacy into four separate torts: intrusion on a person's
solitude; public disclosure of private facts about a person; publicly placing a
person in a false light; and misappropriation of a person's name or like-
ness.2" 2 Plaintiffs alleging breach of privacy based on sexual orientation
would likely seek to place themselves in the first two categories.
There are several significant obstacles to successful claims for breach
of privacy. First, as Mary Dunlap points out, many hold the view, supported
by the language of the Bowers v. Hardwick decision, that lesbians and gay
men are not entitled to expect privacy with regard to their "criminal activi-
ties." '253 Moreover, some argue that the risk of H1V infection, for example,
makes disclosure of private facts reasonable.254 Finally, although few re-
ported cases have found employers liable for invading the privacy of their
lesbian and gay employees, even a successful claim for invasion of privacy
will do nothing to prevent the discharge of employees because of sexual ori-
entation.
Nevertheless, the tort of invasion of privacy may provide some relief,
if the information about the employee was gathered in an unreasonable man-
ner, or used in an unreasonable manner. Two recent cases specifically found
that homosexual plaintiffs had a common law claim for invasion of pri-
vacy.255 Scott Greenwood, a gay attorney employed by the law firm of Taft,
Stettinius and Hollister in Ohio, listed his male partner as the beneficiary of
his insurance plans with the firm.2"' He subsequently brought action, alleg-
ing that this confidential information had been shared with members of the
firm who had no responsibility for administration of benefits.257 Greenwood
Policy" by pursuing this information. See id. Furthermore, the court found there
was a likelihood that the defendant's actions violated the ECPA, which was en-
acted by Congress to address privacy concerns on the Internet. See id.
251. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
252. See id. at 389-407.
253. See Dunlap, supra note 194, at 5-38.5.
254. See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 929 (1988). The author suggests that the balancing test established by the
Federal District Court in Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retar-
dation, 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988), which balances the employee's privacy
interest protected by the fourth amendment and the employer's interest in a safe
training and living environment, might "provide a model for private sector decision
makers who wish to acknowledge civil rights of individuals in the private work-
place, and certainly for legislators considering whether to ban HIV antibody test-
ing by employers." Id. at 958-59.
255. See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995); Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).




claimed that the disclosure about his male partner and his own sexual orien-
tation amounted to an invasion of privacy for which he was entitled to dam-
ages at common law.258 The law firm did not dispute that the fact was, in-
deed, private, but it argued that the disclosure was not public, nor was it
highly offensive to a reasonable person." 9 Because the appeal was taken
from a motion to dismiss, the appellate court did not decide the merits of the
case, but did find that a cause of action for invasion of privacy could lie
based on these factual allegations.
2 60
In a Colorado case another gay employee sued his employer for inva-
sion of privacy.16 The case arose during the controversy over Amendment 2
to the Colorado state constitution.262 Like Greenwood, Plaintiff Borquez was
employed by a law firm.263 Upon learning that his partner had been diag-
nosed with AIDS, and advised by his physician that he should be tested im-
mediately, Borquez met with the senior partner in an attempt to have another
attorney take his cases for the remainder of the afternoon and the next day.2"
As part of that conversation, Borquez advised the senior partner of these
events and asked that the information be kept confidential.265 Within two
days, however, all members of the firm, as well as all other employees, knew
about Borquez's personal life.2 6 Five days later, Borquez was fired.267 At
the trial, a jury awarded Borquez damages for invasion of privacy, as well as
for wrongful discharge.26' The appeals court affirmed the verdict. 269 The
court noted that more than thirty jurisdictions already recognized an action
for invasion of privacy for unreasonable publicity given to the private life of
another27' based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 271' The court found
that both requirements of the Restatement were met: information regarding
sexual conduct and HIV are private matters, and because a strong stigma still
attaches both to homosexuality and AIDS, publication of this information
258. See id. at 1031.
259. See id. at 1035.
260. See id. at 1036.
261. See Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
262. See id.; supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing Amendment 2
and the resulting litigation in Ronier v. Evans).
263. See Borquez, 923 P.2d at 169.




268. See id. at 171.
269. See id. at 178.
270. See id. at 172.
271. See id. The Restatement of Torts provides in relevant part: "One who gives
publicity to the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976)
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would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 72 Furthermore, the court
found that Borquez's sexual orientation was not a matter of legitimate public
concern, particularly given that the confidentiality of a person's HIV status
is highly protected, even in the medical arena where such information can be
very important. 73
A cause of action for invasion of privacy exists not only when the em-
ployer publishes private information, but also when intrusive, unreasonable
methods are used to obtain such information.274 For example, monitoring
dressing areas, rest rooms, or other places where one has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, may give rise to a claim for damages.2 7  Electronic
surveillance may also be in violation of federal law. 276 Given the prejudice
against gay and lesbian persons, however, courts may not be sympathetic to
such claims. Mary Dunlap argues that because of such prejudice, "[c]ounsel
thus must be ready to specifically and dramatically illuminate the nature and
extent of the harm that the person actually has suffered, including psycho-
logical, social, occupational, and related damages.s
27
4. Conclusion
Despite the fact that common law challenges to sexual orientation dis-
crimination have been unsuccessful in the U.S., there are a number of causes
of action that are ripe for development, particularly in the areas of abusive
discharge and invasion of privacy. If societal attitudes show increased toler-
ance towards gay men and lesbians, the common law will mirror this toler-
ance with increased protection of employment-related rights.
C. Canada
1. Introduction
At Canadian common law, there is no protection from discrimination
based on sexual orientation. According to Tarnopolsky and Pentney, the
private individual, group, trade union, or corporation "may discriminate in
employment, in public service industries, in accommodation, even in the sale
of property" absent legislation to the contrary.2 78 Other authors dispute this
272. See Borquez, 923 P.2d at 172-73.
273. See id. at 173.
274. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 225-
320 (1995).
275. See id.
276. See Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(1997).
277. Dunlap, supra note 194, at 5-38.6.
278. WALTER SURMA TARNOPoLsKY & WILLIAM PENTNEY, DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 25 (1982) (updated binder service to Oct. 1998).
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contention, arguing that creative lawyers should be able to fashion causes of
action based on cases in other areas of law.2 79 Mary Dunlap, writing from an
American perspective, suggests possible actions in tort,2"' but does concede
that counsel "may need to invent a tort name to encompass the wrong and
the remedy sought."28 ' She also puts forward several contract actions, in-
cluding breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,2"2 but
is unable to cite any case where such a claim was successful." 3 At a mini-
mum, any common law action based on sexual orientation discrimination
would have to rely on considerable innovation. The following section will
set out some possible legal approaches.
2. Unjust Dismissal
At Canadian common law, an employee engaged for an indefinite term
cannot be terminated unless notice is given, pay is given in lieu of notice, or
there is just cause for dismissal. 4 As a result, a competent employee who is
not terminated in accordance with these rules can bring an action for unjust
dismissal.8 5
There is only one reported case involving an unjust dismissal claim
based on sexual orientation discrimination.286 In Damien v. Ontario Racing
279. See Dunlap, supra note 194, at 5-38.2 to 5-38.8.
280. See id.
281. Id. at 5-38.8.
282. See id. at 5-38.8 to 5-38.9.
283. See id.
284. See Wallace v. United Grain Growers (1998), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 28 (stating
the contractual principle of employment that an employee can be dismissed for any
reason, but must be given reasonable notice or compensation in lieu thereof if the
employee is discharged without cause).
285. See id.
286. See Damien v. Ontario Racing Comm'n (1975), 11 O.R. (2d) 489 (H.C.). At
least until the late 1960s, the explanation may relate to the fact that homosexual
sex was a criminal act. It was only with the Criminal Law Amendment Act, that
homosexual activities between consenting adults were decriminalized. See Crimi-
nal Law Amendment Act, ch. 38, 1968-1969 S.C. 869 (Can.). Accordingly, the fired
lesbian or gay man perhaps concluded that any complaint of unjust dismissal
would not find a court remedy.
That the court would be unsympathetic, if not hostile to a gay man or lesbian
for engaging in what was then considered to be criminal conduct, is illustrated in
Vancouver Sun v. Gay Alliance Toward Equal. [1978] 5 W.W.R. 198 (B.C.C.A.), ap-
peal dismissed, [1979] 2 S.C.R 435. At issue was the Vancouver Sun newspaper's
refusal to publish a classified advertisement on behalf of an association of gay
men. See id. In upholding the newspaper's refusal to publish as stemming from
its policy concerning public decency, Justice Branca stated:
One may well consider that the Criminal Code of our country defines the
commission of an act of gross indecency by one person with another as a
crime punishable with imprisonment (amended in 1968-69, [c. 38, s. 7) to
exclude such acts if committed in private between husband and wife or by
two persons each the age of 21 years, both of whom consent to the com-
mission of the Act) .... One, too, may well consider that under our Immi-
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Commission,287 the plaintiff claimed that he had been dismissed from his po-
sition as a steward with the Ontario Racing Commission because he was a
gay man. 88 His complaint before the Ontario Human Rights Commission
was dismissed on the ground that the commission lacked the statutory juris-
diction to investigate such a complaint." 9 Although Damien filed a state-
ment of claim against his former employer, wherein he sought a "declaration
that his dismissal was wrongful and void, an order reinstating him to that po-
sition, and exemplary or punitive damages for wrongfully and maliciously,
out of bias and prejudice, conspiring to injure the plaintiff in his trade,"'2 90 he
died without the matter having proceeded to trial.29'
It remains to be resolved judicially whether an action for unjust dis-
missal in the circumstances of the Damien scenario would stand. Some sup-
port for such an action is found in the appellate level of the Vriend v. Al-
berta292 case as well as in MacDonald v. 283076 Ontario Inc.2 93 In the latter
case, the Court of Appeal held, in obiter, that dismissal on the basis of sex
alone would not be just "cause, ' '214 but for obvious reasons, this case is of
limited precedential value.
The dismissed employee could argue breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.295 Unfortunately, this common law avenue of
attack may have been foreclosed by the 1997 Supreme Court of Canada de-
cision in Wallace v. United Grain Growers296 which held that there is no ac-
tion either in contract or in tort for "bad faith discharge" in indeterminate
gration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2, homosexuals are classed as undesirables,
together with prostitutes and persons living on the avails of prostitution,
and pimps, all of whom are within the prohibited classes. If one bases a
bias against homosexuals because they are persons who engage in un-
natural sexual activity which may make them guilty of a serious crime in
certain circumstances and because they are forbidden entry into Canada
as undesirables, can one say that such a bias, if it is arrived at for those
reasons, is unreasonable? I would not think so.
Id. at 208.
287. [1975] 11 O.R. (2d) at 489.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 202-03.
290. Id. at 490.
291. See CASSWELL, supra note 20, at 195 (referencing research on the case by
DIMI HERMAN, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: STRUGGLES FOR LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL
EQUALITY 21 (1994)).
292. Vriend v. Alberta (1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595 (C.A.).
293. (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 383 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. denied,
(1979), 14 C.P.C. xliii.
294. See id. at 384.
295. See Shannon Kathleen O'Byrne, Good Faith in Contractual Performance:
Recent Developments, 74 CAN. B. REv. 70, 89 (1995) (discussing good faith in em-
ployment contracts); Case Comment: Wallace v. United Grain Growers, Ltd, - The
Supreme Court of Canada's Conflicting Analysis of Bad Faith Conduct in the Em-
ployment Context, 77 CAN. REV. (forthcoming 1998).




In Wallace, the Supreme Court offers some hope of additional com-
pensation where the employer is "untruthful, misleading or unduly insensi-
,,198tive. In short, such conduct is in breach of the employer's "obligation of
good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal, the breach of which
will be compensated for by adding to the length of the notice period."2 9
While this ruling may provide some protection against employer miscon-
duct, a homosexual employee still cannot challenge the termination itself.
Finally, the potential protections discussed above do not address an
employer's refusal to hire gay or lesbian employees. Justice McClung in
Vriend acknowledges this fact as being welcome, thereby revealing another
deficiency in the common law:
In its current state, the IRPA [now known as the Human Rights, Citi-
zenship and Multiculturalism Act] leaves heterosexuals the choice of
contracting with, or employing, homosexuals. It does not force them to
do so under pain of the imposition of the sanctions of the IRPA. Simi-
larly, homosexuals may employ, contract, or deal with heterosexuals as
they choose. Is this exercise of private choice, ipso facto, discrimina-
tory? It was not proved in the record.3°
3. Potential Tort Actions:
Being dismissed due to one's sexual orientation may be actionable as a
tortious form of harassment.30' However, because the law provides that ei-
ther side to an indeterminate contract of employment may end the contract
for any reason,30 2 the fact that an employer may have a particular reason in
mind, such as the employee's homosexuality, may mean that no action in
tort arises. In the employment context, Canadian common law only contem-
plates recovery in tort in the presence of a separate actionable wrong, such as
where the employer inflicts mental suffering or distress, as in Vorvis v. In-
297. See id. at 27-28.
298. Id. at 34. Note that under Canadian law, any award of damages beyond
compensation for breach of contract for failure to give reasonable notice "must be
founded on a separately actionable course of conduct." Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of
B.C. [19891 1 S.C.R. 1085 (cited with approval in Wallace). Furthermore, and pur-
suant to Vorvis, punitive damages are only recoverable in contract where the em-
ployer's conduct is sufficiently harsh and vindictive, because the general purpose
of damages in contract is merely to compensate the plaintiff. See Wallace, 152
D.L.R. (4th) at 28.
299. Id. at 33.
300. Vriend v. Alberta (1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595, 603 (C.A.).
301. See Lajoie v. Kelly, No. CI 95-01-87469 Winnepeg, 1997 ACWSJ LEXIS
85490, at *7-12 (Man. Q.B. Feb. 6, 1997) (discussing tortious harrassment). For
the view that such a tort cannot exist in light of human rights legislation, see Allen
v. C.F.P.L. Broad. Ltd., No. 17892/94, 1995 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 484, at *7-8 (Ont. Ct.
Jus. Gen. Div. Feb. 17, 1995).




surance Corporation of British Columbia."3 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of Canada has recently dismissed the possibility of suing for the tort of
bad faith discharge.3 4 The plaintiff's option to pursue a common law action
is further limited because, as will be discussed, to the extent that the harass-
ment or other tortious conduct counts as discrimination on a ground prohib-
ited by the human rights legislation of the jurisdiction in question, it may be
that a civil or common law action is barred. 5
Canadian common law might permit an action for nervous shock, such
as when the conduct of the employer has been confrontational and aggres-
sive," or for the tort of intentional interference with economic interests.
30 7
Furthermore, it is possible that an action would lie for breach of privacy but,
so far, such an action is not recognized in Canada as a nominate tort.30 8
The common law of tort appears to provide almost no assistance when
an employer refuses to hire a person because of his or her sexual orienta-
tion.3 9 Instead, the common law has shown a "strict laissez-faire policy,
even where the business or service whose facilities were denied on the
ground of colour or race or ancestry was under government license .... 310
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Christie v. York Corpora-
tion31' that "the general principle of the law of Quebec is that of complete
freedom of commerce" subject only to "a specific law, or, in the carrying out
of the principle, the adoption of a rule contrary to good morals or public or-
der."3 2 More recently, the court has confirmed that position, noting in Se-
neca College v. Bhadauria that the only instance where there has been re-
covery at common law by a plaintiff alleging discrimination has been within
the context of the innkeeper's common law obligation "to receive travellers
or intending guests, irrespective of race or colour or other arbitrary disquali-
fications."'31 3 As Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of Canada summa-
rizes the matter: "[r]ights against discrimination on grounds of race, colour,
creed, sex and so on in employment and accommodation, for example, were
303. [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1085; see supra note 298 and accompanying text
(discussing Vorvis).
304. See Wallace (1998), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2.
305. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing the administra-
tive procedures required by human rights legislation).
306. See Bogden v. Purolator Courier Ltd. (1996), 182 A.R. 216 (Alta. Q.B.)
(discussing nervous shock in the employment context).
307. See LEwIs KLAR, TORT LAw 522 (1996) (listing elements of the tort of inten-
tional interference with economic interests).
308. See id. at 66-67.
309. See Seneca College v. Bhadauria [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, 190.
310. Id.
311. [1940] S.C.R. 139 (finding that a tavern owner was well within his rights in
refusing to serve beer to African-Americans absent a statute to the contrary).
312. Id. at 142.
313. Seneca College [1981] 2 S.C.R. at 191.
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not protected at common law ... ."'" Further, as the dissent in Newfound-
land Association of Public Employees v. Newfoundland"5 states, no case had
been cited "which would suggest that at common law there was anything to
prevent discrimination in hiring or in promoting. However, just as one was
free to discriminate in hiring or granting promotions to employees, at com-
mon law one was free to contract not to discriminate, without exceptions."'3 16
The majority in Newfoundland Association of Public Employees took a
different view regarding the state of the law, however:
No doubt, prior to the Human Rights Code an employer was at liberty
to discriminate in his hiring practices .... This was possible because of
the absence of any statutory prohibition or cause of action for a tort of
discrimination existing at common law. Perhaps in one sense, before
the Human Rights Code became a provincial statute of general applica-
tion, the opportunity and option to discriminate was considered gener-
ally to be a "right", but the prerogative and immunity of an employer to
discriminate was never, in law, elevated to the status of a "right" sanc-
tioned and backed by the law courts.3 1
7
The court may be too generous in suggesting that the common law
never sanctioned discrimination, because there are several examples in
which this occurred.318 Furthermore, the distinction it attempts to draw is
extremely tenuous. In short, is there any functional difference between re-
fusing to protect employees from discrimination or providing a right to dis-
criminate?
It is, of course, entirely possible within the common law tradition for
the court to create new torts. 3 19 Furthermore, to the extent that a common
law rule exists which permits discrimination in hiring, that rule is impeach-
able pursuant to the pronouncement in Hill v. Church of Scientology.32 ° Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court of Canada in that case, the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms will 'apply' to the common law rules affecting pri-
vate civil litigation but "only to the extent that the common law is found to
314. Scowby v. Glendinning (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 180 (Can.) (La Forest,
J., dissenting on other grounds).
315. (1994), 119 D.L.R. (4th) 604 (Nfld. C.A.).
316. Id. at 634.
317. Id. at 619.
318. See TARNOPOLSKY & PENTNEY, supra note 278, at 1-1 to 1-26.
319. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 3-4 (4th ed.
1971).
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development
are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are en-
titled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere
fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the rem-
edy.
Id.
320. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.) (deciding that common law defamation is con-
sistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because the underlying
values of good reputation and the right to privacy are found in both).
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be inconsistent with Charter values. 32' In addition, the court ruled that the
party alleging such inconsistency "[b]ears the onus of proving both that the
common law fails to comply with Charter values and that, when these values
are balanced, the common law should be modified. 322 Given the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Egan,323 it is possible that Charter values
would be imported into any challenge to common law rules permitting dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
In Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College,3 24 the Ontario
Court of Appeal found that the right to be free from racial discrimination is a
fundamental right and, accordingly, it is appropriate that this right "receive
the full protection of the common law." '325 In short, the right to be free from
discrimination existed independently of the human rights legislation which
fixed standards and remedies concerning it.326 That a remedy for such dis-
crimination was granted by the Ontario Human Rights Code did not, in the
court's view, limit the right of the complainant to pursue a common law
remedy, because the right to be free from discrimination existed independ-
ently of the Code.3 27 Unfortunately, this view was rejected by the Canadian
Supreme Court.328 It questioned Madam Justice Wilson's conclusion that a
right to be free of discrimination existed apart from a statute according that
protection.329 Further, the Court accused Madam Justice Wilson of over-
reaching:
The view taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal is a bold one and may
be commended as an attempt to advance the common law. In my opin-
ion, however, this is foreclosed by the legislative initiative which over-
took the existing common law in Ontario and established a different re-
gime which does not exclude the courts but rather makes them part of
the enforcement machinery under the Code.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that not only does the Code
foreclose any civil action based directly upon a breach thereof but it
also excludes any common law action based on an invocation of the
public policy expressed in the Code. The Code itself has laid out the
procedures for vindication of that public policy, procedures which the
321. Id. at 1170-71. It should be noted, however, that scrutiny of common law
in an action between private litigants would be less strict than if government ac-
tion were being impugned, as the case indicates. See id.
322. Id. at 1171.
323. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.CR. 513 (Can.) (holding that refusal to allow a
homosexual partner to collect spousal allowance under the Old Age Security Act
does not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
324. (1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707 (Ont. C.A.) (deciding that a plaintiff who can
show that she was discriminated against in employment because of her ethnicity
has a cause of action at common law).
325. Id. at 715.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See Seneca College v. Bhadauria [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (Can.).
329. See id. at 194-95.
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plaintiff respondent did not see fit to use.
330
As a result of Seneca College, many lower courts have taken the posi-
tion that there can be no tort of discrimination because complaints of dis-
crimination are governed exclusively by human rights legislation.3  Further,
to the extent that the discrimination claim is cast as an employment claim,
judicial relief may be limited by the terms of a collective agreement 3 2 or by
a legislative requirement for arbitration.333
Though there are lower court pronouncements to the contrary,334 the
Supreme Court of Canada has probably not forbidden pursuit of the tort of
discrimination under all circumstances. First, to the extent that the human
rights code in question does not prohibit the kind of discrimination alleged,
the Seneca College decision would apparently have no application. Second,
even when the case does apply, there is a line of authority to permit the tort
action to proceed notwithstanding. 335 For example, Seneca College dealt
330. Id. ,
331. See Mbaruk v. School Dist. No. 42 (Maple Ridge-Pitt Meadows), No.
C956981 Vancouver, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 81256, at *9 (B.C.S.C. Oct. 21, 1996);
Haje v. College of Teachers, No. C954280 Vancouver, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 78806,
at *10-11 (B.C.S.C. Jun. 24, 1996); Allen v. C.F.P.L. Broad. Ltd., No. 17892/94,
1995 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 484, at *7-8 (Ont. Gen. Div. Feb. 17, 1995).
332. See Mbaruk, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 81256, at *10-11 (relying on St. Anne
Nackawic Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Canadian Paper Workers Union, Local 219 [1986] 1
S.C.R. 704). Note that the Supreme Court of Canada has reconsidered privative
clauses. See Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. CAW-Canada [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230; United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bradco Const. Ltd. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316.
333. See Weber v. Ontario Hydro (1995), 125 D.L.R. 583 (S.C.C.) (finding that a
unionized employee did not have an action against his employer either in tort or
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because the legislation
granted exclusive jurisdiction to an arbitrator).
334. See, e.g., Mbaruk, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 81256, at *9; Haje, 1996 ACWSJ
LEXIS 78806, at *10-11.
335. See Lajoie v. Kelly, No. CI 95-01-87469 Winnepeg, 1997 ACWSJ LEXIS
85490, at *11 (Man. Q.B. Feb. 6, 1997) (allowing a cause of action for tortious sex-
ual harassment to proceed despite the human rights code); Alpaerts v. Obront, No.
92-CU-63002, 1993 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 717, at *2 (Ont. Gen. Div. Mar. 25, 1993). In
Alpaerts, the plaintiff alleged that she had been constructively dismissed as a re-
sult of sexual harassment and other mistreatment. Id. at *1. The Court was able
to distinguish Seneca College on the basis that the plaintiff in Seneca had no cause
of action for a refusal to hire apart from the Ontario Human Rights Code, since a
refusal to hire is not actionable at common law, whereas in Alpaerts, the plaintiffs
action related to past and present treatment by her employer. Id. at *2-3. Ac-
cordingly, the court permitted the matter to proceed. See id. at *4. A similar
analysis was utilized by the Ontario Court of Justice in Lehman v. Davis No.
C22568/93, 1993 Ont. C.J. 2616, at *18-19 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). The Ontario Court
of Appeal also employed this analysis in L'Attiboudeaire v. Royal Bank of Canada
(1996), 131 D.L.R. (4th) 445. But see Mbaruk, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 81256, at *9;
Haje, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 78806, at* 10-11.
A related approach seeks to limit Seneca College to those human rights codes
which contain privative clauses. See, e.g., McKinley v. B.C. Tel, No. C952949 Van-
couver, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 77304, at *19 (B.C.S.C. May 1, 1996), appeal dis-
missed, No. CA021941 Vancouver, 1997 ACWSJ LEXIS 91415 (B.C.C.A. Sept. 22,
[Vol. 17:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
with refusal to hire, not unjust dismissal or employee harassment.1 6 In ad-
dition, courts may be sympathetic to common law claims when the statutory
remedy takes too long337 or when the commission administering the law is
part of the problem.338
4. Conclusion
Based on existing authority, creating common law challenges to dis-
crimination faces considerable, and at this time, perhaps insurmountable ob-
stacles in Canada. To the extent that the applicable human rights code pro-
hibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, which functionally is the
case in all Canadian jurisdictions,339 courts may limit the complainant to hu-
man rights legislation remedies. Even if courts were willing to allow com-
mon law challenges, there are few causes of action in tort or contract to ad-
1997). This narrow approach to Seneca College may be justifiable because, as the
Court in McKinley states: "[i]t would be contrary to the modern trend of expedition
and openness in the justice system to decline to exercise a very broad jurisdiction
of this Court except in the clearest of cases." Id. Therefore, a complainant in a
jurisdiction prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation may be able to
pursue a tort remedy, particularly where it could be shown that any statutory
remedy would take a very long while to secure. It was observed in McKinley that:
[als noted in the Lehman line of cases, human rights complaints are often
characterized by a lack of dispatch. The movement of the complaint
through the necessary procedures is beyond the control of the complain-
ant, as well as the respondent. In this case, the plaintiffs complaint ... is
at the preliminary stage .... In these circumstances, the delay resulting
from a stay of proceedings is likely to be significant. The prejudice to the
plaintiff if the stay is granted far outweighs any possibility of prejudice to
the defendants."
Id. at *26-27. Similarly, the plaintiff may have success to the extent that the hu-
man rights commission in the relevant jurisdiction was otherwise part of the
problem. See Smith v. New Brunswick (Human Rights Comm'n) (1996), 137
D.L.R. (4th) 76 (N.B.Q.B.) (allowing a claim of tortious discrimination based on sex
to proceed against a university when the New Brunswick Human Rights Commis-
sion had dismissed his complaints against the university). In Smith, the Court
also refused an application to strike out a statement of claim against the Human
Rights Commission alleging that, in dismissing his complaints of sex discrimina-
tion and in refusing to accept his complaint against the Commission itself based on
sex discrimination, his fundamental justice rights under Section 7 of the charter
were violated. See id. at 77. On appeal, this ruling was reversed on the narrow
ground that the Commission was not a suable entity. See Smith v. New Bruns-
wick (Human Rights Comm'n) (1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 251, 252 (N.B.C.A.), leave to
appeal dismissed, No. 25902, 1997 Can. S.C.R. LEXIS 2161 (Jun. 26, 1997).
336. See supra note 313 and accompanying text (describing the holding of Se-
neca College).
337. See McKinley, 1996 ACWSJ LEXIS 77304, at *26-27.
338. See Smith, 137 D.L.R. (4th) at 78-79.
339. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text (explaining that the ma-
jority of Canadian provinces prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual ori-
entation); see also supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Supreme Court of Canada has "read-in" sexual orientation to Alberta's human
rights legislation). It would appear that the analysis in Vriend would have equal
application to the Northwest Territories.
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dress sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.
Given the uncertain, even negative, state of the common law for
someone alleging the tort of discrimination, it is essential to ask whether
legislation might not be a better, or at least a more assured route, to secure
the enforcement of human rights.
D. The United Kingdom
1. Introduction
Until very recently, British law has allowed employers to discriminate
on grounds of sexual orientation with impunity.' Prior to the enactment of
specific statutory protection against a variety of other forms of discrimina-
tion, a number of alternative legal actions were attempted to test whether
there was any effective control of discrimination through the common law.34" '
Despite two notable early successes,342 the common law has proven to be a
weak instrument and has not been developed to afford any real degree of
protection.343 Of most serious concern is that no independent tort for inva-
sion of privacy is recognized by British common law,3" although this situa-
340. There has been only one reported case in the United Kingdom which re-
sulted in an award of compensation to a person suffering employment discrimina-
tion on the grounds of sexual orientation. See Bell v. Devon & Cornwall Police
Auth., [1978] I.R.L.R. 283 (Eng.).
341. See Nagle v. Feilden, [1966] 2 Q.B. 633 (Eng. C.A.) (involving refusal by the
Jockey Club to grant a trainer's license on the grounds of sex); see also Constan-
tine v. Imperial Hotels, Ltd., [1944] 1 K.B. 693 (involving refusal of an innkeeper
to provide lodgings on the grounds of color).
342. See Nagle, [1966] 2 Q.B. at 633; Edwards v. Society of Graphical and Allied
Trades, [1971] Ch. 354 (Ch. Div'l Ct.) (finding that a specialized tradesman was
entitled to damages when, because of an administrative error, he was released
from his employment).
343. The best account of the inadequacy of the common law to deal with the
problem of discrimination, especially in the context of race, is provided by
ANTHONY LESTER AND GEOFFREY BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN
(1972). They conclude:
[Tihe impotence of the English Judiciary in the face of racial discrimina-
tion is an extreme illustration of the limitations of the Common Law...
in recent decades, when racial equality has become embedded in the pub-
lic philosophy, the English Bench have displayed a marked insensitivity to
the manifestations of racial discrimination. Again and again, their deci-
sions have either implicitly or overtly condoned the unfair treatment of
racial groups, when they could instead have secured a more genuine
equality before the law ....
Id. at 69-70.
344. The possibility of a claim in tort for breach of privacy is unlikely to get very
far in the UK at present. The case of Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Me-
tropolis effectively put an end to the possible development of such a tort by the
common law. [1979] 2 All E.R. 620 (ch.). In a case involving telephone tapping,
the court ruled that English law recognized no general right of privacy. See id. at
620. Further, the court stated that Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
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tion may be ameliorated in the near future with the enactment of the Human
Rights Bill.3 45 British common law acquired much of its present shape dur-
ing the height of laissez-faire, a time when the protection of property and
commercial rights were the dominant concerns of the courts.346 Conse-
quently, the common law has demonstrated an undue deference to the prin-
ciple of freedom of contract, often to the detriment of the weak in society.
34 7
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to expand traditional concepts of
public policy in accordance with changing social attitudes.348
2. Breach of Contract
a. Dismissal
The key concept of British employment law is the contract of em-
ployment, and the theory of freedom of contract is subject only to statutory
restriction and to common law doctrines such as restraint of trade and public
policy.3 49 There are, however, some isolated examples of judicial interven-
tion to ensure freedom from arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rules
which operate to prevent a person from earning a living. 5 Over thirty years
man Rights (the right to respect for private and family life) "did not confer a direct
right on the plaintiff to obtain a declaration that his human rights and freedoms
had been violated because the convention was a treaty and not part of the law of
England and as such was not a matter which was justiciable." Id. at 621.
345. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Human
Rights Bill 1997).
346. See DAVID FARNHAM, THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 247-68 (1995)
(explaining how laissez-faire economics affected British common law).
347. In Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, Sir George Jessel
declared:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is
that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost
liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely
and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of
justice.
19 L.R.-Eq. 462, 465 (I.R. 1875); see also PATRICK SELIM ATIYAH, INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 4-9 (3d ed. 1981) (discussing the factors that promote
free and voluntary exchanges in contracts.).
348. See J. A. G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1997) (suggesting
little has changed).
To some the judicial view of the public interest appears merely as reac-
tionary conservatism. It is not the politics of the extreme right. Its insen-
sitivity is clearly rooted more in unconscious assumptions than in a wish
to oppress. But it is demonstrable that on every major social issue which
has come before the courts in the last thirty years, the judges have sup-
ported the conventional, established and settled interests. And they have
reacted strongly against challenges to those interest.
Id. at 340.
349. See, e.g., Regina v. Ministry of Defense, [19961 Q.B. 517, 541 (Eng. C.A.).
350. See, e.g., Edwards v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades, 1971 Ch. 354,
382 (Ch. Div'l Ct.). Sachs, L.J. maintained that: 'The courts have always pro-
tected a man against any unreasonable restraint on his right to work." Id.
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ago, the possibilities afforded by the common law doctrines of restraint of
trade and public policy were illustrated in the case of Nagle v. Fielden,351 a
case which concerned sex discrimination in the granting of a trainer's licence
by the Jockey Club.3"2 Again, the fertile ground for the development of the
principles has not been judicially attempted, probably because of the emer-
gence of the statutory discrimination actions shortly afterwards.3" The prin-
ciples have not, however, been developed nor has the potential of these cases
been fully explored, because of reliance on statutory provisions outlawing
specific types of discrimination.354
Recent years have witnessed a significant expansion of the implied
terms of the employment contract. 3" This has had some impact in a case of
age discrimination in Scotland, 356 and could undoubtedly be used to assist
victims of workplace harassment on grounds of sexual orientation where an
employer fails to take action. Additionally, a recent case has held that an
employer's equal opportunities policy may be legally binding as an implied
term of the contract.357 This is an important ruling, as there is evidence that
increasing numbers of employers, particularly in the public sector, are in-
eluding sexual orientation in their equal opportunities statements.3 "
351. [1966] 2 Q.B. 633 (Eng. C.A.). In this case, Lord Denning asserted:
[T]he common law of England has for centuries recognised that a man has
a right to work at his trade or profession without being unjustly excluded
from it. He is not to be shut out from it at the whim of those having the
governance of it. If they make a rule which enables them to reject his ap-
plication arbitrarily or capriciously, not reasonably, that rule is bad. It is
against public policy. The courts will not give effect to it.
Id. at 644-45.
352. See id.
353. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (citing various anti-
discrimination statutes)
354. See id.
355. See, e.g., Waltons & Morse Dorrington, [19971 I.R.L.R. 488 (E.A.T.); Wilson
v. Racher, [1974] I.C.R. 428, 430 (Eng. C.A.). Both cases demonstrate that the
area of implied terms has proved a fruitful field for judicial creativity. See [1997]
I.R.L.R. at 488; [1974] I.C.R. at 430. Of particular significance is the implied term
that an employer will treat his employees with respect, first propounded by Ed-
mund Davies, L.J. in Wilson. [1974] I.C.R. at 430. Additionally, it is implied that
the employer will ensure the employee's health, safety and well-being at work. See
Waltons, [1997] I.R.L.R. at 488. For a recent example of this, see Waltons where
the implied term was used to establish the right of an employee not to have to
work in a smoke filled room. Id.
356. See Smyth v. Croft Inns Ltd., [1996] I.R.L.R. 84 (N. Ir. C.A.). The em-
ployer's total lack of concern for the well-being of an employee, who had been the
subject of sectarian threats from customers, amounted to a breach of the implied
duty of trust and confidence, and as such, was a constructive dismissal. See id.
357. See Secretary of State for Scotland v. Taylor, [1997] I.R.L.R. 608 (E.A.T.).
358. See Equality for Lesbians and Gay Men in the Workplace, EQUAL OP-
PORTUNITY REV., Jul.-Aug. 1997, at 20, 22 (citing a survey carried out by the Asso-
ciation of Metropolitan Authorities in June 1995, which found that 90% of the 48




3. Challenging Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Tort
In general, the law of tort has not been used as an avenue to challenge
dismissals on the ground of sexual orientation. In the United Kingdom,
there is no tort which corresponds with the American tort of abusive dis-
charge. As in Canada, however, various forms of harassment have been rec-
ognized as discriminatory and unlawful under the anti-discrimination legis-
lation.359 Without exception, the actions have been brought under the
statutory provisions and not as common law actions in tort.3"
As noted above, there is no action for breach of privacy in the U.K.36'
It remains to be seen what impact the incorporation of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights will have once the Human Rights Bill 1997 be-
comes law. However, the limitations on the use of Article 8 of the Conven-
tion (the right to private and family life) to establish rights for gay people
have been identified earlier.362
There are no cases in the U.K. which directly raise discrimination on
the grounds of sexual orientation in this context, and it is necessary to con-
sider the question of the potential of the common law from a wider perspec-
tive. The closest comparison in tort appears in the case of Constantine v.
Imperial London Hotels Ltd.,363 where Learie Constantine, a well-known in-
ternational cricketer, succeeded in a claim in tort for damages when he and
his family were refused lodgings at the Imperial Hotel, solely on account of
their color.3' However, despite a finding that they had suffered "much dis-
tress and humiliation," only nominal damages of five guineas were
awarded.365 Perhaps because of the inadequacy of the remedies, no other
similar cases appear to have been brought, and the tort has again been super-
seded by the statutory actions for discrimination.
359. See Porcelli v. Strathclyde Reg'l Council, [1986] I.C.R. 564, 564 (Sess.). The
Lord President of the Court of Session expressed the view that sexual harassment
is a "particularly degrading and unacceptable form of treatment which it must be
taken to have been the intention of Parliament to restrain." Id. at 569.
360. See, e.g., Strathclyde Reg'l Council v. Porcelli, [1986] I.R.L.R. 134, 134
(Sess.). Damages in the two actions are awarded on identical principles. See Sex
Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, §§ 65 (1) (b), 66 (Eng.). However, the discrimina-
tion action is heard by the relatively cheap and informal Industrial Tribunal
(whose decisions are fully binding), whereas a tort claim must go to the ordinary
courts. See id. § 63 (1).
361. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (noting the court's refusal to
recognize a general right to privacy.)
362. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing court-implied
limitations imposed on the use of Article Eight for prevention of sexual orientation
discrimination).
363. [1944] 2 All E.R. 171, 172 (K.B.). This case turned upon the specific com-
mon law duty of an innkeeper to receive and lodge in his inn all bona fide travel-
ers, unless he has a reasonable ground for refusal. See id. at 173.
364. See id. at 172.




Common law in the United States, Canada and the U.K. acquired
much of its present shape during the heyday of economic and political lais-
sez-faire, when the protection of property and contract rights were dominant
concerns of the courts.36 Consequently, the common law grants an undue
deference to freedom of contract in the face of marketplace discrimination
and is inherently reluctant to expand traditional concepts of public policy in
accordance with changing social attitudes.367 Concomitantly, there is a
marked judicial reticence - more pronounced in the United States given the
absence of legislative or policy directives - to update common law princi-
ples in order to impeach unfair discrimination on irrelevant grounds.
This reticence is poignantly revealed in the U.S. Supreme Court's re-
fusal to hear the appeal of Shahar v. Bowers.3 68 The importance of constitu-
tional protections in the public employment domain, and as an expression of
the equality of all citizens has already been noted.3 69 The U.S. Supreme
Court, unlike the high courts in Canada and the U.K., continues to counte-
nance the criminalization of homosexual conduct, and thus contributes to the
stigma placed on the gay community.37 In addition, the limited application
of the decision in Romer v. Evans and the continuing validity of Bowers il-
lustrate the absence of judicial will at the highest levels to squarely face the
issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation and remedy it.37'
While Canadian courts have been active in protecting gay and lesbian
rights by reading such protection into several of the human rights codes
across the country, the Canadian common law has proven to be tepid and in-
effectual. Indeed, it is the failure of the common law to address discrimina-
tion that led to the creation of statutory protections.372 Tarnopolsky states
"[i]t is no wonder, then, that the legislatures, with no aid from the judiciary,
366. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (advocating the importance of
maintaining a free and voluntary nature of dealing in contracts); HUGH COLLINS,
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 14-15 (2nd ed. 1993) (discussing and critiquing the persis-
tence of this nineteenth century concept of contract law).
367. See, e.g., Vriend v. Alberta (1998), 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 404-05 (1998)
(analysis by Mr. Justice McClung); see also Shahar v. Bowers, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the lower court on the issue of
whether an employer's interest may outweigh an applicant's right of free associa-
tion under the First Amendment. 114 F.3d 1097 (l1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 693 (1998).
368. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the issues and hold-
ing of Shahar v. Bowers.)
369. See supra notes 40-114 and accompanying text (examining the constitu-
tional status of gay men and lesbians).
370. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Bower deci-
sion).
371. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (attempting to reconcile
Romer's ruling with Bower's holding and the impact of both cases on future cases.)
372. See TARNOPOLSKY & PENTNEY, supra note 278, at 24.
[Vol. 17:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
had to move into the field and start to enact anti-discrimination legislation,
the administration and application of which have largely been taken out of
the courts."373
V. Conclusion: A Call for Legislative Reform in the United States
The U.S. Court for the Southern District of Texas is notable for elo-
quently speaking against discrimination, including discrimination based on
sexual orientation.374 According to United States District Court Judge Kent,
such discrimination is "profoundly wrong" and "violates the fundamental
and essential right of individuals to engage in the full rights and privileges of
citizenship." '375 Despite this example of judicial resolve to protect human
rights, the U.S. has not enacted legislative protection against sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. This failure is even more egregious given the lack of
constitutional protection, and the very limited common law protection avail-
able. Legislative silence in this area serves "to reinforce negative stereotyp-
ing and prejudice thereby perpetuating and implicitly condoning its occur-
rence."37 6 Allowing employers to terminate employees because of sexual
orientation speaks with blunt eloquence to the manner in which the legisla-
tive branch of government can exacerbate and validate homophobia by fail-
ing to accord homosexuals a legal voice.
It remains to be seen whether a statutory approach to human rights
protection would be effective in the U.S. as well as in the U.K. Certainly, a
statutory scheme whereby a complaint of harassment can be made before a
human rights board has potential advantages, including lower costs in pur-
suing a complaint, a greater range of remedies and better over-all access
when compared with traditional court proceedings.377 On the other hand, it
is no solution when governments enact human rights legislation with incom-
plete prohibitions on discrimination, tepid enforcement measures, and ones
which produce low damage awards for complainants. This means that the
outcome for those making human rights complaints is tied entirely to the po-
litical will of those entrusted to address such concerns, be they members of
the judiciary or members of a human rights commission. There is no quick
fix or simple answer. That said, there is a profound and compelling argu-
ment to favor a statutory remedy, namely that a governmental refusal to leg-
islate protection for gay men and lesbians can be seen as validating or con-
doning homophobia.378
373. Id.
374. See Sarffv. Continental Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
375. Id.
376. Vriend v. Alberta [1994] 6 W.W.R. 414, 431 (Q.B.).
377. See June Ross, New Developments in Human Rights Law with Implications
for Employees and Employers, WRONGFUL DISMIsSAL 95-96 (1994).
378. See generally KARST, supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the
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Whereas legislative silences condone prejudice against gay men and
lesbians, inclusive human rights legislation can be a palliative to the walls
which exist between and among groups within society. This Article has
demonstrated that Canada, and to a much lesser extent, the U.K., have taken
the lead in protecting against sexual orientation discrimination. The U.S. has
a long way to go, but a first step would be to act on the words of Senator
Hatfield:
The time has arrived to take the next logical step toward equality of op-
portunity in the workplace. Senate bill 2056, the Employment Nondis-
crimination Act which would prohibit discrimination in employment on
the basis of sexual orientation is such a step .... While we will not be
able to wash this type of deep-seeded hatred from our society merely by
enacting a Federal statute, employment relations is narrowly focused
and appropriate for a Federal statement of national policy, as we have
demonstrated many times .... As this Nation turns the corner toward
the 21st century, the global nature of our economy is becoming more
and more apparent. If we are to compete in this marketplace, we must
break down the barriers to hiring the most qualified and talented person
for the job. Prejudice is such a barrier. It is intolerable and irrational
for it to color decisions in the workplace.
379
problem of social stigma created through law). Writing prior to any judicial review
of Amendment 2 in Romer, Karst states:
[A] court that reviews the constitutionality of the Colorado amendment
will not be doing its job unless it takes account of the amendment's harm-
ful expressive effects: not just effects on the freedom of expression, but the
stigmatizing effects of the amendment's own expression. Stigma - espe-
cially stigma propagated by government - produces harms that are both
immediate and consequential. The immediate harms are psychic: insult,
humiliation, indignity for the people stigmatized. But the amendment's
separation of gay and lesbian Coloradans from the rest of the citizenry
also expresses the legitimacy of antigay fears - and helps to translate
those mental states into a wide range of privately inflicted harms, from
insults to employment discrimination to physical attacks.
Id. at 185-86.
379. 142 CONG. REC. S10,133 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hat-
field) (supporting the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996).
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